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Universal Exceptionalism in International Law
Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner*
A trope of international law scholarship is that the United States is an "exceptionalist" nation, one that
takes a distinctive (frequently hostile, unilateralist, or hypocritical) stance toward international law.
However, all major powers are similarly "exceptionalist," in the sense that they take distinctive approaches
to international law that reflect their values and interests. We illustrate these arguments with discussions
of China, the European Union, and the United States. Charges of international-law exceptionalism
betray an undefended assumption that one particular view of international law (for scholars, usually the
European view) is universally valid.
INTRODUCTION
Among international lawyers, it has long been conventional wisdom that
the United States acts differently from other states. In the nineteenth cen-
tury, it kept to itself, refusing to participate in the wars and alliances that
preoccupied European powers. In the twentieth century, it arrogated for it-
self the role of global leader. After World War II, the United States was the
primary force behind the construction of all the major international institu-
tions: the United Nations, including its human rights regime; the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") and its evolution into the
World Trade Organization ("WTO"); the development and financial insti-
tutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
("IMF"); and the security arrangement embodied by the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO"). With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
United States was transformed from one of two superpowers into the sole
hyperpower.
And yet the United States has, throughout this entire period, showed
ambivalence toward international law. More than any other state, the United
States put financial and diplomatic resources into advancing human rights,'
yet it refused to ratify most of the major human rights treaties, and has
committed major human rights violations, including torture in its opera-
tions against Al Qaeda. It promoted the international trade system yet has
engaged in protectionist measures. It hosts the United Nations and is its
* Assistant Professor of Law and Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law
School. Thanks to Daniel Abebe, Gabby Blum, Curtis Bradley, William Burke-White, Ruoying Chen,
Tom Ginsburg, Jack Goldsmith, Katerina Linos, Darryl Robinson, Joel Trachtman, and participants in a
seminar at Queen's University, for helpful comments, and to Charles Woodworth, James Kraehenbuehl,
and Hanna Chung for research assistance.
1. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox of U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND HuMAN RIGHTs 147 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
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largest dues-payer, yet it has violated the U.N. Charter by launching wars
without U.N. Security Council ("Security Council") approval, and fre-
quently has been in arrears on its dues. It helped negotiate a number of
important treaties-including the Law of the Sea Convention, the Rome
Statute, which created the International Criminal Court ("ICC"), and the
Vienna Convention on Treaties-and then refused to ratify them. It has
resisted numerous efforts to strengthen the laws of war and to ban weapons
such as landmines. As a result, the United States has undermined or seri-
ously weakened the international order it has helped to create and has earned
the resentment of countries not powerful enough to treat international law
as an a la carte menu-or so it is said. 2
In recent years, scholars have searched for explanations for this apparently
distinctive stance toward international law. The usual political science theo-
ries of state behavior assume that states act in roughly the same way. States
might have different capacities and populations, but they all seek to maxi-
mize their security (as the realists argue') or to enhance national welfare (as
rational institutionalists argue 4 ). So the recent literature has sought explana-
tions for America's distinctive international behavior in the unique attrib-
utes of the United States.
The most common explanation today appeals to a long line of literature
on "American exceptionalism." This literature, which goes back to Alexis
de Tocqueville's Democracy in America, holds that the United States is differ-
ent from all other countries.6 In Tocqueville's time, the United States was
the only large country with authentic democratic institutions. Today, most
countries are democracies, but the United States remains distinctive among
them. Ideologically, the United States is more committed to democracy (as
opposed to rule by the elites), equality of opportunity (as opposed to equal-
ity of outcomes), individualism (as opposed to collectivism), and the free
market.7 Culturally, Americans are more religious, more skeptical of author-
ity, more militaristic, and more patriotic." Institutionally, the country is
2. For the bill of particulars, see, for example, Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism
and Human Rights, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1-3 (Michael Ignarieff ed.,
2005); Harold H. Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1480-83 (2003); Anne
Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and
Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 604-05 (2006); Peter Spiro, The New Sovereigntists: American Excep-
tionalism and Its False Prophets, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 9-13.
3. See, e.g., JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICs 29-40 (2001).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POUTICAL ECONOMY (1984); see also Robert 0. Keohane & Lisa L. Martin, The Promise of Institutionalist
Theory, 20 INT'L SEC. 39 (1995).
5. See, e.g., Ignatieff, supra note 2.
6. See generally ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop eds., trans., Univ. Chi. Press 2000 1st ed. 2000) (1835, 1840).
7. See generally SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONAUSM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
(1996).
8. See generally id.
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more decentralized, more legalistic, and more open to democratic
participation.9
How might American exceptionalism explain America's international be-
havior? One argument is that Americans believe that the United States, as
the world's preeminent nation, perhaps one with a unique mission to pro-
mote freedom and democracy, cannot be required to submit to international
institutions. 0 Another is that Americans are less liberal than people in other
countries, and thus oppose international legal change that liberalizes inter-
national relations too extensively." Other explanations appeal to distinctive
attributes of American political institutions-for example, federalism and
the high bar for ratifying treaties.' 2
In this paper, we attack the premise of these arguments. The American
stance toward international law is not distinctive or exceptional-or, put
differently, the United States is no more exceptional than any other powerful
country. When creating international norms, powerful nations characteristi-
cally advance interpretations of international law that reflect their values and
advance their interests. Similarly, powerful nations' willingness to ratify or
comply with international norms hinges on the consistency of those norms
with their values and interests. This type of "exceptionalism" is therefore
not the exclusive preserve of one state. Today, the United States, China, and
the European Union ("EU") advance conflicting interpretations of interna-
tional law. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union
did the same.' 3 The focus on American exceptionalism blinds scholars to the
similar behavior occurring elsewhere.' 4
We further argue that international law is best understood as an overlap-
ping consensus of the otherwise "exceptional" views of the great powers. At
the core are legal norms to which virtually every nation considers itself
bound. Outside the core, there is conflict. In this area of conflict, nations
make inconsistent claims as to the meaning of international law. It is a
9. See Jed Rubenfeld, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1993-95 (2004).
10. See Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony and the Management of Global
Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677, 688 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City on a Hill": Ameri-
can Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1335,
1396-97 (2006).
11. See Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1337-38, 1389-92; Ignatieff, supra note 2; cf Anne-Marie Slaugh-
ter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503 (1995).
12. See Oona Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1307-12 (2008).
13. Some distinctive doctrines of the Soviet view included, at various times: (1) the right to repudiate
treaty obligations after a socialist revolution; (2) the right to intervene to assist a socialist revolution; and
(3) the right to intervene in capitalist countries that fail to protect workers' rights. See generally
KAZIMIERz GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINES AND DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE
(1970); TARJA LANGSTROM, TRANSFORMATION IN RUSSIA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 50-117 (2003).
14. A typical view is that Europeans, unlike Americans, do not have the power to pursue their values
in international law because they are too weak. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffman, American Exceptionalism: The
New Version, in AMERICAN EXCEPTiONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 225, 225-26 (Michael Ignarieff ed.,
2005). We disagree with this premise.
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significant mistake for scholars to accept the claims of any one nation as to
the meaning of international law in this disputed area. It is also a mistake to
dismiss a nation's interpretation of a treaty, for example, as automatically
wrong. As long as nations disagree about the meaning of treaties and other
sources of international law, the content of international law remains
unsettled.
This argument is not entirely new, though it seems to have been forgot-
ten. Hans Morgenthau's influential realist treatise, Politics Among Nations,
notes in passing that all nations interpret or "misinterpret" international
law so as to advance their ends, but he makes an exception for "codifica-
tions," which we reject." States offer self-interested interpretations of codes
and treaties just as they do for customary international law, which was the
focus of Morgenthau's discussion. Lassa Oppenheim's treatise on interna-
tional law notes, but ultimately rejects, attacks on the universality of inter-
national law by commentators who argued that distinctive Soviet and
German versions of international law existed between the two world wars.
"These and similar intrusions of national policies into the sphere of Interna-
tional Law are essentially transient," Oppenheim argues.16 We argue, by
contrast, that disagreements about international law among the great powers
are persistent and of great significance, although, as noted, a core of overlap-
ping consensus does exist.
This paper describes the different "exceptionalisms" of the United States,
China, and the EU. For each state, we trace their "exceptional" international
behavior to their "exceptional" domestic interests, values, and institutions.
While it is sometimes assumed that the European position on international
law is in fact the correct position on international law,17 we argue that, in
fact, the European position is just one among many approaches to interna-
tional law that reflect a mixture of national self-interest and national (as
opposed to universal) values. The United States looks less distinctive when
compared to the world as a whole, than when it is compared only to the
European democracies. Each exceptionalist state advances a particular ver-
sion of international law that must be judged on its merits against some
standard of morality; the accusation of exceptionalism is a straw-man
attack. 18
15. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
298-99 (Kenneth Thompson ed., Knopf 1985) (1948). Codifications refer to laws that have been codified
and published in written form (for example, federal statutes in the United States or civil codes in many
civil law jurisdictions). Codifications can be contrasted to judge-made common law.
16. LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 56 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1948).
17. See, e.g., our discussion of Michael Ignatieffs views, infra Part I.B.
18. In the modern legal literature, the lone example of this view that we have found is Sabrina Safrin,
The Un-Exceptionalism of U.S. Exceptionalism, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1307 (2008) (arguing that the
U.S. stance on international law is not exceptional). Our argument builds on her work. Some skepticism
about the usefulness of the notion of American exceptionalism in international law can also be found in
Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEx. INT'L
L.J. 323 (2009).
6
2011 / Universal Exceptionalism in International Law
Our argument is descriptive, not normative. We do not argue that any
country's view of international law is the correct one.
I. CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTIONS
A. Universalism and exceptionalism
By universalism, we refer to the view that the rules of international law
apply to all states. By exceptionalism, we refer to the view that the values of
one particular country should be reflected in the norms of international law.
By exemptionalism, we refer to the claim that the rules of international law, or
of certain international treaties, should apply to all states except for one
particular state.'9
At one time, international law consisted of a set of contracts typically
involving pairs of states, along with some general norms of customary inter-
national law that were derived from state practice and the official statements
of governments and other state institutions. 20 Occasional multilateral trea-
ties would address the resolution of military conflicts involving multiple
states such as the Napoleonic and Crimean Wars. 2 1 In the twentieth century,
all this changed. Although states continued to enter bilateral treaties, they
increasingly established fora-notably, the United Nations-for negotiat-
ing treaties involving issues of global concern, including the laws of war,
human rights, protection of the environment, trade, and regulation of the
seas. 22 All states would be invited to send delegates to these conventions,
and the expectation was always that the treaty obligations would be the
same for all states, large and small, rich and poor. 2 3
These practices have helped established a presumption of universalism.
Once a global problem is identified, it is understood that an international
solution binding all states should be sought. To be sure, states may continue
to negotiate bilateral and regional agreements to address narrow cross-bor-
der and regional problems, but these agreements, though numerous, must
be consistent with states' obligations under multilateral treaties.
We use the term "exceptionalism" to refer to the attitude of a state that
believes that it is a model or leader in international relations because of its
unique attributes. The state may hold that its institutions are the best in the
world, or that it has a historical mission-and for these reasons, the state's
commitments should be the world's commitments as well. Exceptionalism
does not imply exemptionalism. An exceptional state may choose to comply
with the rules of international law with which it disagrees. If it does violate
19. See Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 4. The term "exemptionalism" is his.
20. See Stephen C. Neff, A Short History of International Iaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 31, 40-41
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003).
21. See id. at 37-49.
22. See id. at 52-56.
23. See id.
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the rules of international law, or some of those rules, it argues that those
rules are inconsistent with international law properly understood. In doing
so, it typically claims that some alternative rules should apply to all states
equally, including itself. Thus, exceptional states need not abandon univer-
salism, and indeed they rarely do. The exceptional state need not take the
next step of exemptionalism, and argue that the rules apply to all other
states but not itself. As we will see, this distinction is crucial; exceptional
states are often accused of exemptionalism, in most instances inaccurately.
To understand this difference, compare two arguments often made about
the U.S. attitude toward international law. Some people argue that the
United States should be exempted from certain types of international crimi-
nal jurisdiction because America sends soldiers around the world to promote
democracy and keep the peace.24 This argument is exemptionalist. The
United States has not made this argument; instead, it has sought safeguards
on criminal jurisdiction-such as the precondition of Security Council au-
thorization before the ICC can launch investigations 2 5-that ensure that no
state taking proper steps to uphold the international order will find its citi-
zens in an international court. Thus, the United States has not argued that it
ought to be exempted from the rules. 26 Instead, it has insisted-consistent
with exceptionalism-that American norms and practices should provide
the basis for international law.
Exceptional states-which are always great powers, although not all great
powers are exceptional states-characteristically advance universalistic views
of international law that embody those states' exceptional norms. We can
distinguish two stages at which this occurs. First, exceptional states attempt
to influence the development of international norms during treaty negotia-
tions, so that international law reflects their values and interests. Excep-
tional states are hardly alone in this respect, but because of their greater
power, they are more often successful, thus generating resentment among
other states. Second, exceptional states attempt to influence the develop-
ment of international norms at the stage of compliance. They often assert
interpretations of existing treaty obligations that reflect their values and
interests, in some cases following up these interpretations with actions that
24. See 147 CONG. REC. 18,231-32 (2001) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (supporting a bill aimed
at hindering the International Criminal Court, because the United States "owets] it ... to our men and
women representing this country, both in the military and in civilian agencies," as they "get ready for a
long campaign against global terrorists," to protect their actions from U.N. "second-guessing").
25. See David J. Scheffer, U.S. Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues, Address before the Carter
Center in Atlanta, GA: U.S. Policy and the Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court (Nov. 13,
1997), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/Schefferll_13_97.pdf (explaining the U.S. position on
ICC jurisdiction to be that the "{United Nations) Security Council should have an essential role to play
in a trigger mechanism").
26. The United States does benefit from its veto in the Security Council, and in this sense one might
argue that it seeks a system in which other states are bound to norms that it can avoid--de facto. We
discuss this argument in Part V.C, infra.
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other states regard as violations of international law. Again, normal states do
this as well, but exceptional states are far more aggressive and successful.
B. The standard view: American exceptionalism and European universalism
Consider this seeming paradox: the United States has been the leader in
advancing human rights around the world since 1945, and yet at the same
time it has both violated human rights itself and coddled tyrants who vio-
late rights. The United States led the way with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the United Nations, and the International Covenant for
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), 2 7 and has put economic and military
pressure on human-rights violating states-far more than any other state
has. 28 But it has also, to quote Michael Ignatieff,
supported rights-abusing regimes from Pinochet's Chile to
Suharto's Indonesia; sought to scuttle the International Criminal
Court, the capstone of an enforceable global human rights regime;
maintained practices-like capital punishment-at variance with
the human rights standards of other democracies; engaged in uni-
lateral preemptive military actions that other states believe violate
the UN Charter; failed to ratify the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women; and ignored UN bodies when they criti-
cized U.S. domestic rights practices. 2 9
This seemingly inconsistent behavior has reinforced a perception of the prev-
alence of American exceptionalism.3 0 Of course, many other countries have
engaged in the same practices; what makes the United States exceptional is
that it also is a global human rights leader.
There are three strands of American exceptionalism. First, the United
States negotiates human rights treaties but ratifies them subject to reserva-
tions that cut back on the scope of its obligations, fails to ratify them, or
ratifies but violates them. For instance, Ignatieff argues that the United
States' decision to attach conditions to its ratification to the ICCPR, a major
human rights treaty, betrays exemptionalism.31 However, as Curtis Bradley
27. Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 30
(2001).
28. See id. at 4-5, 4 n.6 (describing the United States as "by far the most active player" in imposing
sanctions in order to promote human rights).
29. Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 2.
30. Foreign leaders have been quick to condemn the United States' behavior as exceptionalist, accus-
ing the United States of embracing international norms selectively. See, e.g., Ambassador Qiao Zonghuai,
Head of Chinese Delegation to the United Nations, Statement before Vote on Draft Resolution Entitled
"Situation of Human Rights in China" (Apr. 23, 1999), available at http://www.china-un.chleng/rqrd/
jblc/t85086.htm (condemning a resolution on Chinese human rights violations as an example of Ameri-
can "double standards and the politicization of human rights" as evident from the United States' own
human rights violations and refusal or delay to sign and ratify international human rights treaties).
31. Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 5-6.
9
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and Jack Goldsmith have pointed out, virtually all Western states have ac-
ted similarly; usually it is the authoritarian states that do not bother to add
reservations to human rights treaties which they then ignore.32 Ignatieff also
notes that when the United States ratifies human rights treaties, it typically
provides that the provisions of the treaties are not binding as a matter of
domestic law.3 3 However, this is a difference of form, not substance. In
many states international treaties do not enter domestic law without an in-
dependent legislative act and the use of explicit provisions saying as much
are unnecessary.
So if the United States is exemptionalist in Ignatieff's sense, then so are
many other states. In fact, Ignatieff defines exemptionalism so broadly that
it loses its meaning. In the narrow sense in which we use it, none of the
examples discussed by Ignatieff count as exemptionalism because in none of
these examples did the United States claim that rules should apply to others
and not to itself. What is distinctive about the United States is that it re-
jected rules favored by other states, refused to compromise, and instead ar-
gued that all states (including the United States itself) should be subject to
the rules that the United States preferred. This is classic exceptionalism, not
exemptionalism. As we will see, other states engage in similar exceptionalist
behavior.
Second, the United States condemns enemies for human rights violations
that the United States itself commits, and turns a blind eye to friends who
engage in the same behavior. This point has been made most forcefully in
the international law literature by Harold Koh, who calls this type of excep-
tionalist behavior the use of double standards.3 4 However, the use of double
standards is not distinctive behavior of exceptionalist states. Indeed, double
standards compromise exceptionalism; the exceptionalist state believes that
its institutions embody the best rules and those rules should apply to all,
equally. Double standards are better seen as the result of pragmatism (at
best) or inconsistent preferences (at worst), and characterize the behavior of
all states, not just exceptionalist states. A state that seeks to advance human
rights finds that this policy conflicts with other interests, including trade
and security. The state might be willing to compromise its ideals in order to
satisfy the demands of interest groups or inconsistent public preferences. It
might believe that in some settings security interests will advance human
rights more than a consistent line on human rights. When the United States
applies double standards, it simply acts like any other state.
32. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U.
PA. L. REv. 399, 460 (2000); see also Arthur Rovine, Defense of Declarations, Reservations, and Understand-
ings, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 54,
57-59 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
33. Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 14.
34. Koh, supra note 2, at 1485-87.
35. See discussion infra Parts II, IlI.
10
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Third, Ignatieff asserts that American courts do not pay much attention
to foreign judicial rulings when interpreting U.S. constitutional law and,
more generally, American constitutional norms are outside the international
mainstream, or at least the mainstream of developed and democratic states.36
The judiciaries in foreign democracies are more likely to cite foreign courts
than American courts are.3 7 And most states have constitutionalized positive
or social rights-including rights to health care, to work, and to educa-
tion-while the United States has not.38 Most democratic states have also
rejected the death penalty and have weaker protections for speech and relig-
ious association than the United States does. This refusal to go along with
other democratic states can be seen as another manifestation of American
exceptionalism-here, within the realm of judicial behavior and
constitutionalism.
Of course, not all states are democratic. A large minority of states are
authoritarian, and many formally democratic states are either not demo-
cratic-the elites pull the strings behind the scenes-or are unstable, and
cycle between democracy and dictatorship. The question arises why Ignatieff
compares the United States to other democratic states, and indeed he clearly
has in mind the major European democracies, plus Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand, and a handful of other states such as India and South Africa.
These states amount to less than a quarter of the nearly 200 states in exis-
tence. Ignatieff himself admits that he understands American exceptional-
ism against the practices of other democratic states.
After a survey of possible reasons for American exceptionalism, Ignatieff
concludes that the most plausible explanation is that Americans are just not
strongly committed to liberalism. 40 Assuming his diagnosis is correct, here
again Ignatieff does not pause to consider whether international law in fact
embodies liberalism as he understands it-that is, liberalism understood on
the European social-democratic model. The answer is surely no. Consider the
top twenty most populous states in the world (in order): China, India, the
36. Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 4; see also Calabresi, supra note 10, at 1405-06.
37. Despite the ferocity of the normative debate over whether American courts should cite foreign
court decisions, no study directly compares the frequency with which courts in the United States cite
foreign cases relative to foreign courts. However, the general consensus among scholars is that courts in
the United States cite foreign sources much less frequently than do courts outside of its borders. For an
empirical assessment of the extent to which American courts cite foreign cases, see David T. Zaring, The
Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 297 (2006)
(finding that the lower federal courts rarely cite to foreign decisions). In contrast, scholars have noted the
frequency with which courts outside of the United States cite foreign cases. See, e.g., C.L. Ostberg, Mat-
thew E. Werstein & Craig R. Ducat, Attitudes, Precedents and Cultural Change: Explaining the Citation of
Foreign Precedents by the Supreme Court ofCanada, 34 CANADIAN J. POL. Sci. 377 (2001) (finding that the
Canadian Supreme Court often cites foreign cases, especially when interpreting the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms).
38. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521 (1992).
39. See Ignatieff, supra note 2, at 4.
40. Id. at 20; see also Andrew Moravcsik, The Paradox -f U.S. Human Rights Policy, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 147, 150 (giving a related argument that empha-
sizes American institutions and institutional history).
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United States, Indonesia, Brazil, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Russia, Ja-
pan, Mexico, the Philippines, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Germany, Egypt, Turkey,
Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Thailand.4 1 Aside from the ambig-
uous case of the United States, only one state embodying European-style
liberalism-Germany-makes it on the list, and only in the second half of
it. Most of the states-China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Russia, Viet-
nam, Ethiopia, Egypt, Iran, and Congo-are not liberal at all. 4 2 Iran is an
authoritarian theocracy. China, Vietnam, and Russia are also authoritarian
regimes.
Only a person who identifies European norms with world norms could say
that the United States' wavering commitment to liberalism-if that is the
case-explains its exceptionalism. This mistake-the confusion of European
norms and universal international norms-is central to the claim of Ameri-
can exceptionalism. On this view, European norms reflect the universal
norms of international law. We have not seen a defense of this view; it seems
to be merely assumed.4 3
C. Multiple exceptionalisms
Against the conventional wisdom, we propose an alternative hypothesis.
We argue that great powers typically support a view of international law
that embodies their own normative commitments but is presented as a uni-
versal set of commitments. During the Cold War, there were two excep-
tional states-the United States and the Soviet Union-and each endorsed
an exceptionalist, universalistic vision of international law. Today, there are
three exceptional states-the United States, the EU,4 4 and China-and each
advances a distinctive vision of international law:
41. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Country Comparison: Population, available at https:/
/www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last visited Nov. 6,
2010).
42. They are all classified as not free or partly free in Freedom House's 2010 survey. See Freedom
House, Freedom in the World 2010: Global Data, available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiwlO/
FIW_2010_Tables.and_Graphs.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
43. See, e.g., Ignarieff, supra note 2; Rubenfeld, supra note 9 (describing European "universalism").
Rubenfeld emphasizes Europeans' faith in "international consensus" as a source of legal validation and
authority. See id. at 2005-06. He also explains how Europeans are committed to the "universalistic view"
of constitutional law and international human rights law, favoring "supranational legal and political
institutions because most important legal and political principles . . . transcend national boundaries and
indeed exist to check national governments." See id. at 1975-76. Peters, supra note 2, at 605, describes
American exceptionalism against a background of global constitutional values that look suspiciously
European. See also JURGEN HABERMAS, THE DIVIDED WEST 179-84 (2006) (describing Europeans' con-
tinuing commitment to the Kantian cosmopolitan order and contrasting that with American preference
for hegemonic liberalism post 9/11); Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition
and Renewal, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 113, 117 (2005) ("We Europeans share this intuition: the international
world will be how we are. And we read international law in the image of our domestic legalism . . . .").
44. The EU is not technically a state and would better be described a quasi-state. However, we will
refer to it as a state for simplicity's sake.
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American exceptionalism. The United States believes that international law
should promote free markets and liberal democracy. Military force may be
used by any country against threats to this order.
European exceptionalism. Europeans believe that international law should
advance human rights (including positive or economic rights) and social
welfare. Europeans reject the unilateral use of military force. Instead of
resorting to military force, states should pool their sovereignty in interna-
tional institutions that can resolve disputes.
Chinese exceptionalism. China takes the strictest line on sovereignty and
contests the use of military force against independent states. China also be-
lieves that international law should impose less burdensome obligations on
poor countries. According to China, economic growth should take prece-
dence over human rights (at least, in poor countries).
The core of international law consists of the overlapping claims of these
three states. "Unexceptional" or normal countries usually do not bother to
advance distinctive visions of international law because they do not have the
power to affect the development of international law. These states mostly
take the law as given and try to modify it along the margins to suit their
interests. There are some exceptions. In the nineteenth century, the United
States, while it was still weak, advanced a distinctive view of international
law, which may have influenced the development of international law.45
More often, weaker countries form blocs that advance a particular vision of
international law. For instance, the non-aligned bloc that was active during
the Cold War has fallen in line behind China, which by virtue of its power
and size, is the natural leader of poorer countries.4 6 Brazil has emerged as the
leader of the G20, a coalition of the developing countries in the WTO,
which advances the developing country stance in the WTO negotiations
with notable collective clout.4 7 In addition, exceptional states often try to
persuade normal states to sign on to their particular exceptionalist view. The
United States championed the negative rights embedded in the ICCPR and
the former Soviet Union championed the positive rights embedded in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"); both examples reveal two exceptional states trying to convince
normal states to adopt their respective worldviews.4 8 Similarly, the EU often
requires normal states to subscribe to the EU's vision of international law as
a condition for signing a trade agreement or acceding to the EU.49
45. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 16, at 49.
46. See Peter Wonacott & Neil King Jr., Lowering the Wall: China Irks U.S. as It Uses Trade to Embellish
Newfound Clout, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2005 (describing China's increased economic power in Asia, includ-
ing dramatically greater clout among non-aligned countries).
47. See Much Wind and Little Light, EcoNoMIST (U.S.), Oct. 18, 2003 (reporting the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative describing Brazil as the leader of the bloc of developing countries in WTO negotiations).
48. See MICHELINE R. ISHAY, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 221-29 (2004).
49. Magdalena Likovd, European Exceptionalism in International Law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 463, 472-74
(2008).
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In the remainder of this paper, we will flesh out these arguments. For
each state, we will (1) describe its distinctive international legal vision; (2)
explain the source of this vision in domestic public opinion and institutional
structure; and (3) show that these states are exceptional in the same way that
the United States is exceptional.
II. EUROPEAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE PACIFIST SOCIAL WELFARE MODEL
A. European exceptionalism defined
1. Human rights
The EU maintains a strong commitment to international human rights.
Because all EU members have ratified all of the major international human
rights treaties, one might think that the EU's position on human rights
reflects universal values. However, the EU's position is distinctive. The EU
has its own Charter of Fundamental Human Rights, which in turn reflects
in part human rights norms developed by the European Court of Justice
("ECJ"). These norms are, in fact, broader than those embodied in interna-
tional treaties; they also vary in some respects from the norms advanced by
the other major states.
The most distinctive human rights commitment of the EU is its opposi-
tion to capital punishment. 0 The EU has sponsored multiple resolutions at
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights" and at the U.N. General Assem-
bly,5 2 calling for a moratorium or outright abolition of capital punishment.
The EU also discourages the death penalty through its bilateral relations: it
has criticized the United States for including reservations in international
human rights treaties to preserve the death penalty5 3 and filed amicus curiae
briefs in cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has considered the suitability
50. Article 2 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Human Rights provides, "Everyone has the right to
life" and "No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed." Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1. All EU member states have signed the 13th
Protocol of the 2003 European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR"), which commits the signatories
to the permanent abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances.
51. See, e.g., U.N. Economic and Social Council, Comm'n on Human Rights, 56th Sess., 66th mtg. at
17-19, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/SR.66 (Dec. 21, 2000), available at hrtp://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/
doc[UNDOC/GEN/G00/136/03/PDF/G0013603.pdf; U.N. Economic and Social Council, Comm'n on
Human Rights, 55th Sess., 58th mtg. at T 38-44, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/SR.58 (July 13, 1999),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/docfUNDOC/GEN/G99/132/70/PDF/G9913270.pdf.
52. See, e.g., Memorandum by the European Union at the 54th United Nations General Assembly 10
(Sept. 21, 1999), available at htrp://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/memo-en_99.pdf; Eu-
ropean Union, EU Welcomes UN Vote Calling for a Global Moratorium on the Death Penalty, EU/NR 118/
07 (Nov. 16, 2007), available at http://www.eurunion.org/eulindex.php?option=com-content&task=
viewid=91&Itemid= 58.
53. See Press Release, European Union, EU Demarche on the Death Penalty, Presented to the US
Administration on May 10, 2001, available at http://www.eurunion.org/eulindex.php?option =com
conrent&rask=view&id= 1959&Itemid= 26.
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of capital punishment for juvenile or mentally retarded criminal offenders."
The EU has further required the United States to sign a treaty guaranteeing
that it will not seek the death penalty in murder cases that involve a request
for extradition from an EU member state.55
But not all of the EU's positions on human rights are so broad. The
American commitment to freedom of speech and political association is
stronger than the European view. European human rights norms do not pro-
hibit the suppression of parties and certain types of derogatory speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Some American
criminal law protections (such as the exclusionary rule5 6) have no counter-
part in European courts. As we will discuss later, China endorses a much
stronger right to development than the EU does. On China's view, poor
countries may abrogate other rights for the sake of alleviating poverty and
maintaining order; the EU does not believe that the right to development
can trump civil and political rights. While Europeans would argue that
China is simply giving less weight to those other rights than it should, a
more accurate description is that there is disagreement as to the relative
weights of the right to development and other rights when they conflict.
At times the EU's commitment to human rights conflicts with its inter-
national law obligations. In 2001, the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions
Committee, an organ of the Security Council, placed the Saudi businessman
Yassin Abdullah Kadi on a list of individuals associated with Al Qaeda."
Under the Security Council resolution that established the Sanctions Com-
mittee in 1999, all states have a legal obligation to freeze the assets of the
individuals on the Sanctions Committee's list, including Kadi.5 8 The EU
adopted a regulation to implement the U.N. resolutions that called for the
freezing of terrorist funds, including those of Kadi.19 Kadi subsequently
54. European Comm'n, Background: EU Policy against the Death Penalty 2 (Sept. 2008), available at
htrp://www.eurunion.org/DPBackground-9-08.doc; see, e.g., Brief for the European Union and Members
of the International Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 331
(2008) (No. 08-5573), 2007 WL 1874804; Brief for the European Union and Members of the Interna-
tional Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Maharaj v. McDonough, 549 U.S. 1072
(2006) (No. 05-1555), 2006 WL 1594034; Brief for the European Union and Members of the Interna-
tional Community as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331
(2006) (Nos. 04-10566, 05-51), 2005 WL 3530558.
55. John R. Schmidt, The EU Campaign against the Death Penalty, 49 SURVIVAL, no. 4 123, 127
(2007): see also Peter Finn, Germany Reluctant to Aid Prosecution of Moussaoui, WASH. PosT, June 11, 2002,
at Al (reporting on Germany's threat to withhold evidence if the accused, Moussaoui, may be punished
with the death penalty).
56. The exclusionary rule prevents the state from using illegally obtained evidence in criminal or
quasi-criminal proceedings when reliance on such evidence would effectively violate individuals' right to
be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. See Herring v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. 695, 699-704 (2009).
57. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the EU, 2008 E.C.R. 1-06351 32,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri = CELEX:62005JO402:EN:HTML
(hereinafter "Kadi").
58. See S.C. Res. 1267, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999); see generally Kadi, supra note 57.
59. Council Regulation 881/2002, 2002 O.J. (L 139) 9 (EC).
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challenged this regulation before the ECJ. In 2008, the ECJ ruled that the
Sanctions Committee's designation of Kadi did not bind the EU's member
states.6o According to the ECJ, the process established by the Sanctions
Committee offended fundamental human rights norms under European law
because Kadi did not have an adequate opportunity to challenge the placing
of his name on the Committee's list.6' Accordingly, European countries
could not freeze Kadi's assets without violating Kadi's due process rights
and, consequently, European law. To all appearances, the ECJ's judgment
was accepted by European governments.
The ECJ's judgment indirectly challenged provisions of international law
aimed against a major problem of international security and undermined the
authority of the Security Council. Declaring that "the obligations imposed
by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the con-
stitutional principles of the EC Treaty," 62 the ECJ elevated the human
rights guarantees enshrined in EC treaties and general principles of Euro-
pean law above the U.N.-generated norms to fight terrorism.63 This was
perceived as a departure from the EU's customary role as a staunch supporter
of international law and the integrity of the United Nations.6 4
2. Social welfare
The EU has sought to maintain a high level of what it calls "social pro-
tection," sometimes at the expense of its international law obligations.6 1 For
instance, the EU insists on its right to keep foreign products out of its
market on grounds of food safety and other health policy concerns, precau-
tion in the field of biotechnology, cultural diversity, and other social welfare
rights, even when doing so violates EU's obligations under international
trade law.6 6
The EU's pursuit of social policies that conflict with trade liberalization
has led to challenges in the WTO. Most prominently, the EU's social wel-
60. See generally Kadi, supra note 57.
61. Id at IT 321-28.
62. Id. at 285.
63. See id. The ECJ added that even though the EU constitutional norms and the U.N. Charter exist
on a separate plane (consistent with the dualist view of international law), if they were to be classified
within the same hierarchy of norms within the EU's legal order, the U.N. Charter would be subordinate
to the EC Treaties and the general principles of law. See id. at 91 305-08.
64. Grdinne de Birca, The European Court ofJustice and the International Legal Order after Kadi, 51
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 4-5 (2010); see also Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the
EU, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, at 1 38 (Jan. 16, 2008), available at http://curia.
europa.eu/en/content/juris/c2_juris.htm (follow "C-402/05 P" hyperlink; then follow "C-402/05 P"
hyperlink next to "Opinion").
65. The European Commission coordinates various "social protection" and social inclusion initiatives
that, among other things, combat poverty, reform welfare systems, and provide support for problems
caused by demographic changes. See European Comm'n, Social Protection & Social Inclusion, htrp://ec.
europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catld=750&langld=en (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
66. Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaidis, The European Union as a Conflicted Trade Power, 13 J. EUR.
Pue. PoL'Y 906, 921-22 (2006).
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fare objectives clashed with its WTO obligations when the EU sought to
prohibit the importation of hormone-treated beef into the EU. Following a
complaint from the United States, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ruled
that the EU's ban was not based on scientific evidence, and hence not justi-
fied under the relevant WTO rules.6 7 Similarly, the EU sought to restrict
U.S., Argentine, and Canadian imports of agricultural and food products
that contained genetically modified organisms ("GMOs"). The WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Panel found the EU's restrictions were contrary to its obli-
gations under the WTO. 6 Despite these rulings against the EU, the EU has
remained reluctant to modify its domestic policies, preferring to violate in-
ternational trade law and endure WTO-authorized trade sanctions.
Trade conditionality offers an effective instrument for the EU to export
its social welfare model abroad.6 9 In derogation from the principle of most-
favored-nation (non-discrimination among trading partners), the WTO al-
lows developed countries to set up preferential tariff schedules to developing
countries under the Generalized System of Preferences ("GSP").70 The EU
uses its GSP system to foster its preferred social policies in the beneficiary
countries: it rewards countries that ratify the main international conventions
on human rights, labor standards, and sustainable development and pun-
ishes countries that do not.7 1 For instance, in 1997 the EU withdrew My-
anmar's GSP privileges because of Myanmar's forced labor practices.
Similarly, Belarus lost its GSP status in 2007 for persistent violations of
labor rights, including rights to organize and to engage in collective bar-
gaining.72 The United States similarly uses the GSP scheme to advance its
distinctive view of international law. Thus, resorting to trade conditionality
as an instrument to advance one's exceptionalist agenda is not a prerogative
of a single state-yet the set of values that the GSP scheme is used to pro-
mote differs depending on the identity of the exceptionalist state that ex-
tends conditional preferences to its trade partners.
67. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hor-
mones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WTIDS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
68. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Prod-
ucts, WT/DS291/R, WTIDS292/R, WT/DS293/R, at Part VIII, §§ 8.14, 8.18, 8.34, 8.38 (Sept. 29,
2006).
69. Meunier & Nicolaidis, supra note 66, at 913.
70. Jan Vanderberghe, On Carrots and Sticks: The Social Dimension of EU Trade Policy, 13 EUR. FOREIGN
AFF. REV. 561, 569-70 (2008).
71. Id. at 570.
72. Id. (citing European Comm'n, Promoting core labour standards: Commission grants additional tariff
preferences to Sri Lanka and initiates an inquiry into labour rights violations in Belarus (Jan. 7, 2004), available
at http://trade.ec.europa.euldoclib/docs/2004/january/Eradoc_115531.pdf); Council Regulation (EC) No
552/1997 of 24 March 1997 Temporarily Withdrawing Access to Generalized Tariff Preference from the
Union of Myanmar; Council Regulation (EC) No 1933/2006 of 21 December 2006 Temporarily With-
drawing Access to the Generalised Tariff Preferences from the Republic of Belarus.
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3. Pooling sovereignty
The EU sees itself as the "frontrunner" and the "driving force" behind
international institutions.7 3 The countries that would later form or join the
EU (aside from Germany and other members of the defeated Axis) played an
essential role in establishing the post-World War II institutions, including
the United Nations, the WTO and the Bretton Woods institutions. The EU
itself is the outcome of sovereignty-sharing among its twenty-seven mem-
bers. While the EU does not have a common police force to enforce its law,
its member states have submitted to authentic legislative, judicial, and exec-
utive institutions that issue legally binding orders that are routinely obeyed.
A trope of EU public relations is that if historic enemies on the European
continent can pool sovereignty, then so can countries throughout the world.
The Europeans also pooled their sovereignty by establishing a Council of
Europe whose membership extends to forty-seven countries and thus beyond
the member states of the EU.7 4 The Council of Europe seeks to advance
democratic principles and human rights throughout Europe based on the
European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR")." The Council of Eu-
rope also established a European Court of Human Rights vested with juris-
diction to hear allegations of violations of the ECHR. Similarly, the EU has
participated enthusiastically in the U.N. human rights committees, forums,
and conferences,'7 6 and has pursued numerous initiatives in the context of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
The EU was also a prime supporter of the ICC. All twenty-seven mem-
bers of the EU have joined the ICC, including those states that needed to
amend their constitutions in order to do so.T The Rome Statute is among
73. European Comm'n, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament-
The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism, at § 1.1, COM (2003) 526 final
(Sept. 10, 2003), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga.doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!Doc
Number&lg =en&typedoc=COMfinal&andoc= 2003&nu doc = 526.
74. Council of Europe, Council of Europe in Brief Who We Are, available at http://www.coe.int/about
coe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). The Council of Europe is distinct
from the European Council. The Council of Europe promotes democracy and human rights among its
forty-seven member states, while the European Council is a decision making body in the European Union
("EU"), consisting of the heads of all EU member states.
75. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224, available at http://www.echr.coe.int/nr/rdonlyres/d5cc24a7-dcl3-
4 318-b 4 57-
5c9Ol4916d7a/O/englishanglais.pdf. The rights and freedoms secured by the ECHR include, for exam-
ple, the right to life (abolishment of death penalty), the right to a fair hearing, the right to privacy,
freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and the protection of property. The
ECHR prohibits, for example, torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, forced labor,
arbitrary and unlawful detention, and discrimination in the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms secured
by the Convention.
76. These forums and conferences include, for instance, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the
Third Committee of the General Assembly, the Commission on the Situation of Women, the World
Conference against Racism of 2001, and the U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Children of
2002. The EU is also active in supporting the High Commissioner for Human Rights. See European
Comm'n, supra note 73, § 1.1.
77. Int'l Criminal Court, The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ASP/
states+parties/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2010); see Jeremy Rabkin, Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-
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the numerous multilateral treaties that the EU requires states to sign as a
condition for acceding to the EU.7 8 The EU also encourages ratification of
the Rome Statute outside of its immediate sphere of influence through ac-
cession, including sponsoring annual U.N. resolutions supporting the ICC.7 9
4. Presumptive pacifism
The EU is skeptical about the use of military force. It sees itself as a
"soft," "moral," or "normative" power that relies on its influence rather
than force in maintaining world peace.80 European security strategy there-
fore calls for preventive efforts-including the spreading of democratic ide-
als, human rights, and reduction of poverty-as means to peace and
security.8 I The European Commission describes "the distinctive European
approach" to international peace and security as follows:
[The EU has] worked to build human security, by reducing pov-
erty and inequality, promoting good governance and human
rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of
conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to
countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting
stabilisation. . . . These achievements are the results of a distinc-
tive European approach to foreign and security policy.8 2
The core of the European Security Strategy is that military force should only
be used as a last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted. The
Member States?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 273, 278 (2000) (noting that Germany and France amended their
constitutions to adhere to the Rome Statute).
78. See European Council, The European Union and the International Criminal Court, at 9 (Feb. 2008),
available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ICCjinternetO8.pdf (explaining that
"[aichieving the widest participation in the Rome Statute was also an EU objective during the enlarge-
ment negotiations and accession phases of the new EU Member States"); see, e.g., id. at 10-11 (lauding
Croatia's support for the ICC and highlighting the EU's commitment to furthering universal acceptance
of the ICC); cf Council Common Position on the International Criminal Court (EU) No. 444/2003 of 16
June 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 150) 67-68.
79. See European Council, supra note 78, at 15-16; U.N. GAOR, 63rd Sess., 45th plen. mtg. at 10,
U.N. Doc. A/63/PV.45 (Nov. 11, 2008); U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., 57th plen. mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. Al
62/PV.57 (Nov. 26, 2007); U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 56th plen. mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/61/PV.56 (Nov.
20, 2006); U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess., 53rd plen. mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. A/60/PV.53 (Nov. 23, 2005).
80. See Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union (EU) SN 273/01 of 15 Dec. 2001
("[The EU is) a power wanting to change the course of world affairs in such a way as to benefit not just
the rich countries but also the poorest. A power seeking to set globalisation within a moral framework, in
other words to anchor it in solidarity and sustainable development."). See generally Ian Manners, Normative
Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40 J. CommoN MKT. STUD. 235 (2002).
81. See European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, at 4, 9, S407/08
(Dec. 11, 2008), available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressdata/EN/
reports/104630.pdf; European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, at 6,
10 (Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. An ex-
ample of this strategy is the EU's Everything But Arms initiative, which grants duty-free and quota-free
access to all exports, excluding arms and munitions, from the least developed countries. See Council
Regulation 416/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 60) 43 (EC); Meunier & Nicolaidis, supra note 66, at 917.
82. European Council, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, supra note 81, at 2.
19
Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 52
EU also rejects the preventive war doctrine, and insists that Security Council
authorization must be secured before force is deployed.83
Despite the pacifist rhetoric, individual EU member states have engaged
in military operations in recent years-for example, in the war in Afghani-
stan, which was authorized by the Security Council. EU members have even
used military force without international legal justification. The U.S.-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003 violated international law because it did not serve
any country's defensive purposes, and it was not authorized by the Security
Council. 4 Although France and Germany opposed the invasion, the United
Kingdom, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain (in addi-
tion to a number of European countries that acceded to the EU the year
following the Iraq invasion) contributed troops to the mission. In 1999, all
of the European members of NATO, plus France, went to war against Ser-
bia, again under the leadership of the United States. The intervention vio-
lated international law: it was not a war of self-defense, and it lacked
Security Council authorization. NATO characterized the military operation
as a humanitarian intervention that was designed to stop the ethnic cleans-
ing that Serbs orchestrated against Albanians in Kosovo.85 The military alli-
ance stepped in when an individual state (Serbia)-and subsequently the
Security Council-failed to discharge its responsibilities to protect individ-
uals amid an exceptionally grave, unfolding humanitarian catastrophe.86
There are two important observations here. First, the European view on
the legality of the use of force is distinctive. The dominant view among the
European countries is that military force should be used only as a last resort,
ideally (although not necessarily) with Security Council authorization, and
in the service of humanitarian ideals-a point emphasized by Tony Blair in
justifying British participation in the Iraq War, and made more generally
during the Kosovo intervention. The U.S. and Chinese views, as we will see,
differ. Second, the EU has been willing to assert aggressive interpretations of
international law in order to justify its position. Thus, the idea that "hu-
83. See European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, supra note 81, at
1, 9 (recognizing the United States' "dominant position as a military actor" but stating that "no single
country is able to tackle today's complex problems on its own" and that "[tihe United Nations Security
Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security"); see also
European Council, Extraordinary European Council, Brussels, 17 February 2003, at 1, 6466/03, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cmsData/docs/pressDatalen/ec/7 4 554.pdf (stating that "[florce
should be used only as a last resort" in resolving the crisis over Iraq's compliance with Security Council
resolutions).
84. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 Am. J. INT'L L.
607, 610-17 (2003) (arguing that the 2003 invasion of Iraq violated international law and the U.N.
Charter).
85. Press Conference, Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe of NATO (Mar. 25, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm.
Solana justified the bombing as necessary to "stop further humanitarian catastrophe."
86. Int'l Comm. on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect xi-xiii (Dec. 2001),
available at htrp://www.iciss.ca/pdflCommission-Report.pdf (giving a synopsis of the principles of R2P
and the guidelines for determining whether military intervention is justified).
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manitarian intervention" could be legally justified even without Security
Council authorization emerged during the Kosovo intervention.
B. Explaining European exceptionalism
1. Domestic policy preferences: social welfare, human rights, and pacifism
Domestic policy preferences emphasizing the importance of social welfare
explain the distinctive vision of international law that Europe advances. Eu-
ropean public opinion supports the "social market economy," a compromise
between socialism and laissez-faire capitalism that features a generous safety
net, some industrial policy, strong unions, and more intrusive market regu-
lation than one finds in the United States. 7 Of course, the United States and
every other developed country similarly supply a minimum safety net and
regulate the market. But the faith in the role of the government as the
provider of social welfare is a more central part of the European identity
than it is in most other Western countries.
This commitment to welfare state and government regulation is reflected
in the EU's trade policy. Although critics allege that the EU's breach of
WTO rules in the cases of beef hormones and GMOs reflect protection-
ism 8 8-and without doubt the European producers of hormone- and GMO-
free products benefit from the EU's insistence that free trade must occasion-
ally yield to health concerns 89-the EU has asserted that it is merely re-
sponding to European consumers' concerns about food safety. Public
sentiment within the EU is skeptical of GMOs and hormones in food. A
2006 survey of European consumers revealed that sixty-two percent of re-
spondents across the EU were "worried" about the food safety risks posed by
GMOs.90 A similar opinion poll from 2001 showed that seventy-one percent
87. This is often referred to as an "embedded liberalism" compromise. See John G. Ruggie, Interna-
tional Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG.
379, 392-98 (1982); see generally G0sTA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITAL-
ISM (1990).
88. See, e.g., Panel Report, supra note 68, at §§ 4.152-53, 4.173-4.180 (outlining the U.S. argument
before the WTO, which contrasted the EU's purported purpose of maintaining food safety with the
discriminatory effects of the food safety regulations); Benedetto Della Vedova, Op-Ed., Bio-Fueling a
Trade War, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020
4313604574328533995657764.html (giving one former European Parliament member's opinion that
the EU uses environmental protections to disguise protectionism).
89. European cattle farmers do not use hormones in raising cattle, whereas U.S. beef producers give
hormones to ninety percent of their cattle. See Frode Alfnes & Kyrre Rickertsen, European Consumers'
Acceptance of US Hormone-Treated Beef, 3(3) EUROCHOICEs 18 (Nov. 2004). Similarly, by restricting the
importation of GMO-products to Europe, the EU's measures adversely affect the United States, Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Canada, which cultivate ninety percent of the GMOs and food containing GMOs world-
wide. Press Release, European Comm'n, Europe's rules on GMOs and the WTO (Feb. 7, 2006), available
at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference= MEMO/06/6 1&format= PDF&aged= 1 &lan
guage=en&guiLanguage=en; see also WTO panel rules EU GMO moratorium illegal (Feb. 8, 2006), http://
www.euractiv.comlen/tradelwto-panel-rules-eu-gmo-moratorium-illegal/article-1 52341.
90. European Comm'n, Special Eurobarometer 238: Risk Issues, at 53 (Feb. 2006), available at http://ec.
europa.eulpublic-opinion/archives/ebs/ebs-238 en.pdf
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of Europeans do not want GMOs in their food.9 Regarding hormones, a
1998 Eurobarometer survey shows that fifty-four percent of those surveyed
indicated it important for food safety that food was "100% free from hor-
mones." 92 These surveys show that the import-competing industries are not
alone in urging the EU to violate WTO law when social policy considera-
tions so warrant.
Europe's recent history of wars and violence stands prominently among
the reasons behind the EU's human rights advocacy and presumptive paci-
fism. The extreme nationalism and the brutality of two World Wars im-
planted revulsion for war and engrained the ideals of human dignity and
pacifism deep within the European mindset. The legacy of wars and violence
has heightened the EU's concern for human rights. For instance, large-scale
state-sanctioned violence that the Europeans endured partly explains why
opposition to the death penalty is the paramount concern in the EU's exter-
nal human rights policy.93
These experiences have also caused the EU to largely refrain from using
military force and pursue peaceful means to solve international disputes. The
EU has not established a European army. Rather, it considers itself a "civil-
ian power" that pre-empts military conflicts through institutional engage-
ment and diplomacy. This explains why most EU countries did not share
U.S. concerns about joining the ICC: states that are frequently engaged in
military operations abroad are aware that their soldiers might one day be
forced to stand a trial before the ICC. This threat was not significant for
most EU states, which are rarely involved in international military con-
flicts. 9 4 Only Britain and France, both with extensive military capacities,
initially expressed reservations about the ICC but ultimately assented to the
other EU members' joint position in the end.95
This explanation of the presumptive pacifism of Europe should not, how-
ever, be taken too far. Britain and France used considerable violence to pre-
vent the loss of their colonies after World War II. Britain fought a war in
Malaysia. France fought wars in Indochina and North Africa. Both countries
91. European Comm'n, Eurobarometer 55.2: Europeans, Science, and Technology, at 40 (Dec. 2001), availa-
ble at http://ec.europa.eu/research/press/2001/prO612en-report.pdf.
92. European Comm'n, Eurobarometre 49: La Securite des Produits Alimentaires, at 15 (Sept. 3, 1998),
available at http://ec.europa.euldgs/health_consumer/library/surveys/eb49_fr.pdf; see also Jayson L. Lusk et
al., Demand for Beef from Cattle Administered Growth Hormones or Fed Genetically Modified Corn: A Comparison
of Consumers in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 85 A-m. J. AGRic. ECON. 16, 23
(Feb. 2003) (reporting that, on a scale of one (not concerned) to five (very concerned), French, German,
and U.K. consumers reported average levels of concern of 4.54, 4.38 and 4.20, respectively, regarding the
use of hormones in livestock production).
93. See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97, 126-27
(2002) (noting that the death penalty was outlawed in several European countries in the immediate
aftermath of WWII, following the wave of executions of innocent civilians without a trial); see also
Schmidt, supra note 55, at 125 (noting that other European countries kept capital punishment on their
books but refrained from enforcing the punishment).
94. See Rabkin, supra note 77, at 279.
95. Id.
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participated in an ill-fated attack on Egypt in 1956. Despite the absence of a
European army, all the major European countries have maintained large ar-
mies. 96 They participated in the 1999 Kosovo War, the 1991 Gulf War, the
war in Afghanistan, and (many of them, above all Britain) the 2003 Iraq
War. European countries also did not make the promotion of democracy and
human rights a priority in international relations until relatively recently-
at best, in the last two decades.97
Thus, European pacifism is as rational a response to the current global
distribution of military power as it is a reflection of a European ideology.
Europeans remain hostile toward unilateral use of force largely because
Europeans have limited capacity to engage in unilateral military action
themselves.98 Insisting on multilateralism ensures that Europeans have a
vote on whether and when U.S. troops are dispatched to fight for interna-
tional peace and security. The relatively benign U.S. hegemony (in European
eyes) also enables Europeans to embrace pacifism: as long as the United
States keeps the world peace, Europe is not required to spend money on
armies and take the risks of war.9 '
2. Institutional structure
The European countries have had disproportionate influence over the cre-
ation of current multilateral institutions. The voting power in the existing
institutions, including the U.N. and Bretton Woods institutions, reflects
the distribution of power in the world following World War II: the EU
member states hold two of the five permanent and two of the ten nonperma-
nent seats in the Security Council. Similarly, the EU (together with the
United States) wields disproportionate influence in the IMF and the World
Bank. In light of this, the EU's enthusiasm for preserving existing institu-
tional cooperation is hardly surprising.
The EU has been successful in incorporating its vision into many multi-
lateral arrangements, including treaties as diverse as the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the Landmines
Treaty, the Rome Statute, and the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change ("Kyoto Protocol"). The EU's
"hybrid" institutional structure helps it shape international agreements and
96. See infra Table 1, at note 210. It should also be noted that this is not a recent historic develop-
ment, as the great powers of Europe have long maintained among the largest standing armies in the
modern world. See Mearsheimer, supra note 3, at 83-137.
97. See Diego J. Lifin Nogueras & Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez, Human Rights Conditionality in the
External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 307, 315-17
(2001) (describing the sequence of agreements made to create a policy of external promotion of human
rights as beginning in the mid-1990s).
98. See Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, 113 POL. REv. 3, 13-14 (2002).
99. See, e.g., id. at 8.
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institutions toward its preferences. 00 The EU often bargains as a single en-
tity, enjoying the leverage of the biggest trading bloc in the world.1to How-
ever, when it comes time to vote, the EU casts twenty-seven votes on the
matter. The EU can also refrain from making commitments, using the argu-
ment that the European Commission negotiates as a constrained agent of the
member states.10 2 For instance, the Commission can resist demands to re-
move agricultural protection by saying that it cannot secure the backing of
the French farmers for the proposal. Presenting the "French problem" as an
"EU problem," the French farmers' demands suddenly enjoy the bargaining
power of a trading bloc speaking on behalf of 500 million consumers.103 The
EU may therefore be more eager to join an international agreement than
other states because its bargaining tactics give its member states more power
to affect the agreement's content.
The EU's own experience with integration may explain why it strongly
advocates the pooling of sovereignty internationally. The long experience
with integration in Europe has eroded the rhetorical power of "sover-
eignty"-the notion, deeply entrenched in the United States and China,
that any loss of authority to supranational institutions is an intolerable af-
front to the dignity of a state. The EU also considers itself to be a thriving
example of how international conflicts can be overcome and how countries
can peacefully co-exist and prosper. As we discuss below, in comparing the
EU to the United States, European countries have a less populist form of
democracy than the United States does, and, as a result, lack populist skepti-
cism of remote bureaucracies. 0 4 European experience with fascism in World
War II left the Europeans skeptical of popular democracy. An important
function of international law is therefore to act as an antinationalist force by
checking national sovereignty and guarding states against "democratic ex-
cess."105 As a result, there is less popular resistance in Europe to delegation
of authority to international agencies.10 6
100. See generally Meunier, supra note 66 (discussing how the EU is a power in trade and through
trade).
101. See id. at 908-09. Currently there are 27 members in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European Union, Member States of the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/
european countries/eu members/indexen.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
102. Meunier, supra note 66, at 909. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics:
The Logic of Two-level Games, 42 INT'L ORG 427, 434 (1988) (explaining two-level bargaining when a
constrained agent negotiates on behalf of a principal).
103. Rabkin, supra note 77, at 274-75.
104. See Rubenfeld, supra note 9, at 1975 (contrasting American "democratic constitutionalism" with
European "international constitutionalism").
105. Id. at 1986-87, 2006.
106. However, integration has produced a backlash. See Grdinne de Bdrca, After the Referenda, 12
EUROPEAN L.J. 6 (2006) (describing the failure to ratify a European Constitution as a moment of public
expression on the direction of the EU that cannot be ignored); see also Maria Cahill, Ireland's Constitutional
Amendability and Europe's Constitutional Ambition: The Lisbon Referendum in Context, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1191,
1191-94 (2008) (describing how the Lisbon Treaty was rejected by popular referendum in Ireland); Eric
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Finally, the EU advocates strong multilateral institutions, in particular
security institutions, because of its own limited ability to engage in uni-
lateralism. While the EU member states have pooled their sovereignty on
many issues of economic importance, the common foreign and security pol-
icy of the EU is limited. Any decision relating to security policy is subject
to the requirement of unanimity among the twenty-seven member states.
There is also no common European military force that can be dispatched to
intervene in international conflicts.10 7 Insisting on obtaining Security Coun-
cil authorization for the use of military force thus rarely constrains the EU's
own military ambitions, yet gives its important member states, France and
the United Kingdom, a right to a veto any attempt by the United States to
exercise force unilaterally. Thus, as long as the EU continues to lack a
strong, unified European military force, it is likely to prefer constraining
other exceptionalist states' unilateralism through the disproportionate influ-
ence it wields in the Security Council.
III. CHINESE EXCEPTIONALISM: MINIMALIST DEVELOPMENTALISM
A. Chinese exceptionalism defined
1. Strict sovereignty
China's vision of international law rests on the principle of sovereignty.
Under the Chinese view, sovereign states have an inalienable right to exer-
cise jurisdiction over their territories and their people without interference
from other states.108 The internal affairs of a state are left for the state's own
people to govern; international affairs are decided by consultation among
states acting on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. 0 9 While the inte-
Posner, Europe's Missing Identity, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2010 (describing the limits to supranational delega-
tion of powers to international institutions in the absence of common identity).
107. The EU has deployed forces under the name of the "European Union Force" four times-to
Macedonia (2003), Bosnia (2004), Congo (2006), and in Chad and the Central African Republic (2007).
These deployments, however, are not from a permanent EU military, which the EU has failed to create
due to internal disputes and continued reliance and deferral to NATO. See James G. McLaren, Europe's
Efforts to Develop an Autonomous Defense Capability, A Constitution of Europe, and the Implications for NATO, 11
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 523, 523-36, 548-56 (2005).
108. Over the years, China has continued to assert that its sovereignty extends to Taiwan, which it
considers to be a province under its "one China" policy. Because of this, China has blocked Taiwan from
joining the United Nations as a member and impeded Taiwan's ability to enter into relations with other
states. Foreign governments' attempts to engage directly with Taiwan have provoked strong reactions in
Beijing. For instance, when the United States announced its intention to sell advanced weapons to Tai-
wan in 2001, China protested by stating that the weapons deal would violate the Sino-U.S. open commu-
niqud and infringe China's territorial sovereignty. See Bj6rn AhI, China, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW § C, available at http://www.mpepil.com/subscriberarticle?script=yes
&id=/epil/entries/law-9780199231690-el876&recno=24&letter=c.
109. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Address at the
Rally Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (June 28,
2004), in 3 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 363, 365-66 (2004), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/opics/
seminaronfiveprinciples/t 140777.htm.
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grated global economy inevitably compromises states' economic sovereignty,
their military, political, and cultural sovereignty remain inviolable." 0 Con-
sequently, China rejects all perceived attempts, including criticism of its
human rights policies, to undermine its sovereignty."'
China bases its vision of international law on the "Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence," which were first established in an agreement between
China and India in 1954. These principles are mutual respect for the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of other states; mutual non-aggression; mutual
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states; equality and mutual
benefit; and peaceful coexistence.11 2 Since then, these principles have become
a guiding doctrine of international relations for the Chinese government."'
Of these principles, the most elemental in China's view is the principle of
sovereignty." 4 In commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Five Princi-
ples in 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao referred to sovereignty as "the
birthmark of any independent state, the crystallization of its national inter-
ests and the best safeguard of all it holds dear.""'
As a part of its efforts to promote a world order based on the principle of
sovereignty, China accords strong authority to the U.N. Charter and the
Security Council." 6 Qian Qichen, former foreign minister of China, gave
special emphasis to the United Nations' role in maintaining a pluralist
world, describing the United Nations as the "most universal, representative,
and authoritative international organization in the world."" 7 Moreover,
Qichen called on states to uphold the United Nations' authority and to ac-
knowledge its dominant role in conducting international affairs." 8
China has applied this view of international law to maintain its position
that human rights concerns do not trump the principle of sovereignty.
China regularly defies criticism of its human rights record by the United
Nations, foreign countries and NGOs." 9 It resists the Western concept of
110. Ahl, supra note 108, § C.3.
111. See Rosemary Foot, Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,
82 INT'L AFF. 77, 88 n.31 (2006).
112. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, The Five Principles, available at
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/seminaronfiveprinciples/tl40589.htm.
113. Xue Hanquin, Chinese Observations on International Law, 6 CHINEsE J. INT'L L. 83, 86 (2007). Xue
is the Chinese member of the International Law Commission.
114. Id.
115. Wen, supra note 109, at 365.
116. See Foot, supra note 111, at 91-92.
117. Id. at 91.
118. Id
119. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Statement By H.E. Am-
bassador Qiao Zhonghuai, Head of the Chineses [sic] Delegation, Before the Vote on the Draft Resolu-
tion Entitled "Situation of Human Rights in China" at the 56th Session of the Commission on Human
Rights (April 18, 2000), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/gjs/gjzzyhy/259 4 /2596/tl
5151.htm; U.N. Human Rights Council Fourth Universal Periodic Review, 11th Plenary Meeting Web-
cast (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=090209; Ariana
Eunjung Cha, China Tells U.N. Panel That It Respects Rights, WASH. PosT, Feb. 10, 2009, at A12; cf
People's Daily Online, Full Text of the Human Rights Record of the US in 2004 (Mar. 3, 2005),
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human rights as incompatible with its non-Western and non-democratic
society. 120 Under this view, advancement of norms relating to human rights
and democratic governance presumes a hierarchy of civilizations, and leads
to an imposition of one's culture and values on others.
China has also opposed U.N. human rights resolutions against other
countries, fearing that such resolutions are primarily tools to exert political
pressure on developing countries.121 In January 2007, for instance, China
used its veto in the Security Council to block a resolution denouncing
human rights violations in Myanmar. In doing so, it argued that the U.N.
Charter grants the Security Council authority to intervene in the internal
affairs of a state only if there is a threat to international peace and security.
This criterion, according to China, was not satisfied in the case of My-
anmar.12 2 Similarly, China opposed a proposed Security Council resolution
authorizing military intervention in Kosovo in 1998, asserting that the Ko-
sovo matter was an internal affair of the state. 123
The United States and EU have challenged China's non-intervention pol-
icy and called on China to support responsible humanitarian intervention.
Recently, China has-slowly and reluctantly-backed away from its earlier
stance that state sovereignty can never be compromised on humanitarian
grounds. 12 4 Concerned over its international reputation, China reversed its
position on Myanmar and supported a subsequent Security Council state-
ment condemning Myanmar's violent suppression of peaceful demonstrators
in the fall of 2007.125 China also pressed Sudan to accept the U.N. and
African Union peacekeepers in Darfur. 1 26 Still, it is unlikely that China will
depart from its non-interference principle except when put under significant
foreign pressure. 12 7 China's official position on humanitarian intervention
continues to be a minimalist one: intervention is justified only in response
available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/03/eng20050303175406.html (China's response
to the United States' periodic report of the human rights record in China).
120. See Ahl, supra note 108, § C.6.
121. Zhu Lijiang, Chinese Practice in Public International Law: 2007(11), 7 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 735, 741
(2008).
122. U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007) (remarks by
Wang Guangya, Chinese representative to the United Nations).
123. U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 3868th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3868 (Mar. 31, 1998) (remarks by
Shen Guofang, Chinese representative to the United Nations).
124. See C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA'S RisE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 227-28 (2008).
125. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson
Liu Jianchao's Remarks on the Chairman's Statement of UN Security Council on the Myanmar Issue
(Oct. 12, 2007), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cnleng/xwfwls2510/2535/t371707.htm; see U.N.
SCOR, 5757th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5757 (Oct. 11, 2007); see also Human Rights Council Res. S-5/1,
Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Draft Resolution / Portugal (on Behalf of the European Union),
5th Sess., Oct. 2, 2007, U.N. GAOR, 62d Sess., A/HRC/S-5/L.1/Rev. 1, (Oct. 2, 2007).
126. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Hu Jintao Meets with Sudanese
First Vice President (July 19, 2007), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/xybfs/xwlb/t34
3862.htm; see also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Yang Jiechi Welcomes
UN Security Council Resolution to Send Peacekeeping Force to Darfur (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http:/
/www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/wjbz/2 4 67/t34 7715.htm.
127. See BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 124, at 228.
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to a target state's request to intervene and only if U.N. authorization is first
secured. 1 2 8
The principle of sovereignty also dominates China's position toward the
ICC. The Rome Statute grants the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals for
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, provided that those in-
dividuals' own states are unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute the
case.12 9 This precondition, called the "complementarity principle," dis-
suaded China from signing the Treaty in the end, even though it partici-
pated in the treaty negotiations.13 0 China maintained that "jurisdictional
sovereignty of states should be strengthened rather than compromised."' 3 '
China opposed the complementarity principle on the grounds that the ICC's
decision to pronounce a state unable or unwilling to prosecute a case could
be politically motivated.132 In refusing to expose its domestic criminal jus-
tice system to a possible review by the ICC,'13 China confirmed that state
sovereignty and the principle of non-interference are the key ordering prin-
ciples of its vision of international law.
2. Developmentalism
Even with China's emphasis on the principle of sovereign equality, China
does not envision that all sovereign states should have equal rights and re-
sponsibilities. Instead, the Chinese maintain that states' international obli-
gations ought to be adjusted to their different stages of development and
their unequal capacities to comply with international law.' 3 4 For the Chi-
nese, the right to development is a fundamental principle of international
law.'>' Developed countries are in a better position to maintain international
order.'3 6 Consequently, they must accept more burdensome obligations in
providing public goods, including a clean environment and liberal trade
order. In contrast, developing countries are entitled. to various exceptions
that reflect their lesser abilities to assume international obligations. Accord-
ingly, China advances a vision of international law that is grounded on the
idea of fairness and redistribution.
128. Ahl, supra note 108, § C.5.
129. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5, 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90.
130. See Lijun Yang, On the Principle of Complementarity in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 121, 130-32 (2005).
131. Xue, supra note 113, at 92.
132. Id. at 93.
133. See id. at 91-92.
134. See, e.g., Zhu, supra note 121, at 754-55 (quoting a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson who
explains the Chinese "common but differentiated responsibilities" policy as it relates to international
environmental law).
135. See Ahl, supra note 108, § C.6.
136. See, e.g., Rosemary Foot, Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State, CHINA J., Jan. 2001, at 1,
12.
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This developmental perspective guides China's position on international
environmental law. When negotiating states' responsibilities to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, China supported the
Protocol but resisted the imposition of binding obligations on developing
countries.'3 7 According to China, developed countries should bear the pri-
mary responsibility for global environmental protection due to their higher
level of industrialization and, consequently, their disproportionate contribu-
tion to climate change. Developed countries also have the resources to invest
in technologies that enable them to reduce environmental harm. China's
position, which ultimately prevailed, reflects the principle of "common but
differentiated responsibilities"-"common," because climate change entails
risks that affect all states; "differentiated," to suggest that not all states have
to contribute equally in reducing or eliminating those mutual risks.'3 8 In-
stead, this view stresses that wealthier states should assume a greater share of
the burden of fighting climate change. While promulgating its commit-
ment to (non-binding) emission cut targets during the Copenhagen climate
change negotiations in 2009, China continued to insist that developed coun-
tries must assume the leadership role in fighting climate change.'3 9
Similarly, in the WTO, China supports the principle of special and differ-
ential treatment, which allows for various exceptions and preferences for de-
veloping countries. For instance, developing countries benefit from an
"enabling clause" that permits derogations to the non-discriminatory treat-
ment in favor of developing countries.140 The enabling clause therefore
forms an exception to the principle of reciprocity, which calls for the ex-
change of balanced concessions among states. In practice, this means that
developed countries extend preferential tariff schedules to developing coun-
tries without offering the same concessions to their other (developed coun-
try) trading partners. Nor do developing countries need to open their
domestic markets to the same extent as developed countries.' 4  Developing
countries are also eligible for transitional periods that allow them to adjust
137. See Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 276, 279 (2004).
138. Id. at 276-77.
139. Nat'I Dev. and Reform Comm'n of the People's Republic of China, Implementation of the Bali
Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference (May 20, 2009), available at http://
en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521-280382.htm.
140. "Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, contracting parties may
accord differential and more favorable treatment to developing countries, without according such treat-
ment to other contracting parties." Differential and Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation
of Developing Countries, L/4903 at 1 (Nov. 28, 1979), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/
legal e/tokyo enabling e.pdf (note that this document was promulgated within the WTO's predecessor
framework, the GATT).
141. The preferential tariff treatment of developing countries is often administered under domestic
GSP programs, which the enabling clause allows individual states to set up. The United States, for
instance, provides a duty-free entry for about 4800 designated products from over 130 beneficiary coun-
tries and territories. These do not include China. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Generalized
System of Preference (GSP), available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/trade-development/preference-
programs/generalized-system-preference-gsp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010); Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
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to surges in foreign imports, and for technical assistance to help them im-
plement new WTO commitments.14 2
China's approach to international human rights also follows the logic of
developmentalism. According to Chinese policy, the key human right is the
right to development, which trumps all others in the hierarchy of the
human rights discourse. 1 4  Civil and political rights have to yield, when
necessary, to the larger goal of economic development. The Chinese view
on human rights also emphasizes collective rights over individual rights.
Human rights are not understood to be inalienable rights that precede the
existence of the state.' 4  Rather, China emphasizes that human rights derive'
from the state, which can grant those rights, subject to conditions. 14 6 Since
human rights derive from the state, China argues, nations will vary in their
understanding of human rights based on their national traditions and level
of economic development.
China's pursuit of redistribution of power and wealth from North to
South is characteristic of the developing countries' decades-strong commit-
ment to a more equitable division of wealth. In the 1970s, developing coun-
tries advanced proposals for a New International Economic Order ("NIEO")
through the United Nations.147 One product of these efforts was the adop-
tion in 1974 of the Resolution for a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties
of States by the U.N. General Assembly.' 4 8 The idea behind the NIEO and
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties was to offer an alternative to the
Western-dominated Bretton Woods institutions, and revise the interna-
tional economic system in favor of developing countries. Arguing that they
deserved restitution for the economic and social costs of colonization, devel-
oping countries demanded trade concessions and more generous foreign aid
than they had received in the past.' 4 9 They also demanded the right to ex-
propriate foreign property without paying full compensation.5 0 While
China was never able to claim restitution relating to colonization, it follows
sentative, Information on Countries Eligible for GSP, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
ATT%20(A)%20-%20090417%20GSPBDC.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
142. Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA ET AL., THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY
386-88 (1st ed. 2003).
143. See Zou KEYUAN, CHINA'S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 244 (2006) (citing
Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, Human Rights in China, Government White Paper 1
(1991)) ("the right to subsistence is the foremost human right the Chinese people long fight for {sic}").
144. Foot, supra note 111, at 84.
145. Ahl, supra note 108, § C.6.
146. Id.
147. MIrsuo MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 142, at 388-89.
148. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974);
see also Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 40/182, U.N. GAOR, 119th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/182 (Dec. 17, 1985).
149. Mrrsuo MATSUSHITA ET AL., supra note 143, at 388-89.
150. See Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INTL L. 639, 647-51 (1998) (describing developing countries'
efforts to undermine the Hull Rule, which required "prompt and adequate" payment for expropriation of
foreign property, in favor of an alternate international rule that allowed for self-determined payment).
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the legacy of the NIEO by holding that states should grant special treat-
ment to developing countries in key areas of international law.' 5'
B. Explaining Chinese exceptionalism
1. Domestic policy preferences: economic growth and reduction of poverty
China's staggering growth rates have transformed China from a rural un-
developed country to an economic powerhouse.15 2 With a GDP exceeding
four trillion dollars, China has the second largest economy in the world after
the United States. 5 3 China's massive trade surplus has allowed it to accumu-
late over two trillion dollars in foreign exchange reserves. 1 4 Few would
question that China has emerged as an economic giant that wields signifi-
cant power in the global economy.
Despite its astounding economic growth, China remains a poor country.
With a GDP per capita of about $6000,'" China ranks 101st in the
world. 5 6 Lifting people out of poverty is of the utmost concern to the vast
majority of the Chinese people. Acquiescence in authoritarian rule rests in
part on the Chinese government's ability to pursue economic growth, allevi-
ate poverty, and spread wealth to an increasing share of its population.
China's rapid economic rise has had the downside of increasing economic
inequality within China, heightening the risk of political tensions. There is
ethnic and religious conflict in the western provinces, and civil unrest
throughout the country.'" The Chinese government has determined that
only continued high economic growth can maintain social order and politi-
cal stability.5 8
151. See Zha Peixin, H.E. Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,
Speech at the Chinese Economic Association Annual Conference (Apr. 14, 2003), available at http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceukleng/dsjh/t27161.htm; see also Su Wei, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's
Republic of China, Statement by the Chinese Delegation on Agenda Item 154: The Progressive Develop-
ment of International Legal Principles and Rules for a New International Economic Order (Oct. 16,
2000), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceun/eng/chinaandun/legalaffairs/sixthcommittee/t2856
0.htm.
152. Access to foreign markets has fueled China's economic growth and allowed it to sustain growth
rates averaging over nine percent each year since its 2001 accession to the WTO.
153. David Barboza, China PassesJapan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2010, at A12.
154. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Reserves of Foreign Exchange
and Gold, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.
html (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
155. Int'l Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weol
2009/01/weodataweoselgr.aspx (click "all countries" hyperlink and select China; then click "select all";
then select start year "2008" and end year "2008") (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (GDP per capita based on
the current international dollar, purchasing power parity, using 2008 statistics).
156. Id. (click "all countries" hyperlink and "select all"; then select "Gross domestic product based
on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per capita GDP" and select start year "2008" and end year "2008";
download table and sort by 2008 column) (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
157. See, e.g., Is China Fraying?, THE EcoNoMsT (U.S.), July 11, 2009.
158. See Yang Yao, The End of the Beijing Consensus, FOREIGN AFF., Feb. 2, 2010, available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65947/the-end-of-the-beijing-consensus ("Since the Chinese Communist
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In its quest for continuing economic growth, China pursues an export-led
growth strategy and manipulates its currency so as to keep the prices of its
exports artificially low. To further facilitate its trade, China acceded to the
WTO, taking advantage of the special and differential treatment available
for developing countries.15 9 Special and differential treatment allows devel-
oping countries to benefit from longer time periods for implementing WTO
commitments.160 These provisions also allow developed countries to increase
trading opportunities for developing countries without offering comparable
opportunities for other WTO member states.
China has also insisted on special and differential treatment in global cli-
mate change negotiations. In 2006, China passed the United States as the
largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world, and China's emissions con-
tinue to grow at a very high rate. 6 1 China's high rate of emissions is the
result of its booming economy and consequent high use of energy in manu-
facturing. China's comparative advantage in international manufacturing is
partly based on low energy costs as a consequence of its large coal reserves.
Thus, China has weak incentives to switch to alternative fuel sources or to
sign any international treaty that would force it to do so.
To resist demands for significant cuts in its emissions, China has advo-
cated a developmentalist response to climate change. It has proposed using
countries' historical emissions as a benchmark for assigning emission reduc-
tion targets among states. 162 Over the course of the history of industrializa-
tion, most emissions originated from developed countries when they were
pursuing greater levels of development; this is akin to what China is cur-
rently doing. Alternatively, China has suggested that per capita emissions
should form a baseline for contemplated emission reductions.'6 3 Using per
capita emissions as a benchmark for the state's global responsibility would
have a very different impact on China's responsibilities than any metric fo-
Party (CCP) lacks legitimacy in the classic democratic sense, it has been forced to seek performance-based
legitimacy instead, by continuously improving the living standards of Chinese citizens.").
159. WTO rules do not contain a definition of a "developing country." Instead, states self-designate
themselves as developed or developing countries as part of a political calculus. The United States and the
EU persistently opposed China's attempts to claim developing country status based on the size of its
economy and trade flows.
160. See WTO Committee on Trade and Development, Implementation of Special and Differential Treat-
ment Provisions in IVTO Agreements and Decisions, WT/COMTDIW/77/Rev.1, at 8 (Sept. 21, 2001).
161. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 905, 914
(2007-08).
162. See Eric Neumayer, In Defense of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 33 EcoLoGi-
CAL ECON. 185, 187 (2000) (noting that "almost every scholar and policy maker from the developing
world" supports factoring differences in historical emissions into a comprehensive climate change
agreement).
163. For an overview of the Chinese position, see Nat'1 Dev. & Reform Comm'n of the People's
Republic of China, China's National Climate Change Programme (June 2007), available at http://www.
ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/Filel88.pdf. For an analysis of the Chinese position, see Eric A.
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565, 1602-11 (2008).
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cusing on total emissions: China's current per capita emissions are only one-
sixth of that of the United States.'6
China's position on international human rights can also be seen through
the lens of developmentalism. Contesting the Western idea that political
and civil rights take precedence, China argues that these rights must be
subordinated when they conflict with measures that promote economic
growth and maintain political stability that is necessary for growth.
2. Institutional structure: authoritarianism
Insisting on respect for the diversity of political, cultural, and social sys-
tems, 65 China has resisted the ideals of democratic governance that threaten
the core values of the one-party state and the Chinese government's ability
to secure domestic political and social stability. 66 Thus, the Chinese notion
of human rights is tilted in favor of economic and social rights at the ex-
pense of civil and political rights. As Gerald Chan has observed:
Under China's political structure and culture, human rights are
granted by the state and can easily be taken away by the state. If
individual human rights run against state interests, the latter will
usually prevail. 67
International norms that protect political rights pose the greatest threat to
the stability of the Chinese government. China may fear that consenting to
any such norms would establish a focal point for dissident activity and lead
to a more visible demand for political freedoms-a development that would
resemble the signing of the Helsinki Accords, a 1975 agreement between
the Western countries and the Soviet bloc countries, which was widely seen
to have fueled political dissident activity in the Soviet satellites and ulti-
mately contributed to the collapse of communism.16
The United States and other Western democracies have long predicted
that China's receptiveness to economic globalization and liberal market in-
stitutions would spur political change in China.' 69 Yet the link between
164. See Vandenbergh, supra note 161, at 917.
165. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Joint Statement of the
People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Major International Issues (May 23, 2008),
available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t465821.htm.
166. Foot, supra note 136, at 17.
167. Ivan Rasmussen, Torture in the United States and China: Comparing American and Chinese Exception-
alism with Respect to the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 2 ASIAN J. Pus. AFF. 65, 69 (2009)
(citing GERALD CHAN, CHINA S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE, ARMS CONTROL, ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTs 177 (2006)).
168. For an argument that the Helsinki Accords helped delegitimize communist states, see generally
DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL NORMs, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE
OF COMMUNISM (2001). In particular, Article 7 of the Helsinki Accords calls for "respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms" and argues for the guarantee of the freedoms of thought, speech,
conscience, religion, and faith of all citizens of the signatory states, including the communist states. See
Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295.
169. See Ying Ma, China's Stubborn Anti-Democracy, 141 POL'Y REV., Feb.-Mar. 2007, at 3, 4-5.
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economic liberalization and democratization in China has proved to be elu-
sive. China has enjoyed economic benefits from liberal international institu-
tions while resisting any political liberalization that was expected to follow
from its increasing international engagement. The Chinese government has
also nurtured a sentiment among its citizenry that Western-style democracy
would be unsuitable for China's current economic conditions. According to
the government, embracing civil and political rights incorporated in inter-
national human rights treaties would destabilize Chinese society and endan-
ger its pursuit of economic welfare for the benefit of its citizens.o7 0 This idea
has resonated with many Chinese citizens, who want to avoid China under-
going the social instability, weak economic growth, and declining national
influence that Russia experienced after the Soviet Union collapsed. The Chi-
nese citizenry's support for the current regime is also fueled by some degree
of nationalism and anti-Americanism, making it more receptive to authori-
tarianism and skeptical of the "imposition" of American-style democracy
through international norms.' 7 1 Authoritarianism has also persisted as
Western powers have pursued economic engagement with China rather than
trying to influence China's human rights policies.
Despite its skepticism of many U.N. initiatives relating to individual
rights, China views the United Nations as helpful in promoting its own
vision of international law. The United Nations does not pose a threat to
China's authoritarian government because of the exceptional status and in-
fluence China holds within the organization. As a permanent member of the
Security Council, armed with a veto right, China knows that it can single-
handedly prevent any U.N. action that adversely affects China's interests.
The United Nations is not a democratic organ, and that suits China. Rather,
the United Nations is a forum where China enjoys an equal voice with the
other great powers. The Security Council seat also provides China its most
effective means to balance and constrain U.S. power.172 China is therefore
eager to maintain the current structure of the U.N. system and offers its
unwavering support for the authority of the Security Council.17 1
170. See id. at 10-11.
171. Id. at 11.
172. See Foot, supra note 111, at 92.
173. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Keynote Speech by Assistant
Foreign Minister Shen Guofang, Towards an Enhanced Role of the UN Security Council in Maintaining
International Peace and Security (Nov. 21, 2003), available at http://www.fmprc.gov. cn/eng/xwfw/zyjh/
t45317.htm.
34
2011 / Universal Exceptionalism in International Law 35
IV. AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM REVISITED: PRO-MARKET DEMOCRACY
A. American exceptionalism defined
1. Negative liberties and markets
The United States has a longstanding commitment to political and civil
rights. These commitments are reflected in the U.S. attitude toward human
rights treaties. The United States has ratified the ICCPR, the human rights
treaty that embodies the standard list of civil and political rights.17 4 It has
refused to ratify the ICESCR, the human rights treaty that embodies the
standard list of social, economic, and cultural rights.17 5 The U.S. approach to
other human rights treaties fits this pattern. The United States has ratified
the Torture1 7 6 and Genocide Conventions, 1" since the rights to be free from
torture and genocide are derived from civil and political rights that prohibit
the government from abusing its citizens. Other treaties that concern social
rights (for example, those promoting the rights of children and disabled
persons), which the United States defines more narrowly, have not been
ratified.
These commitments are also reflected in American foreign policy. 78 The
U.S. State Department compiles an annual report that criticizes foreign
countries for violating human rights. Each country report follows a template
that focuses on civil and political rights-including free speech and associa-
tion, religious freedom, torture, and voting-and ignores social and eco-
nomic rights such as education, health care, and social insurance.179 The only
exceptions to this pattern are that the reports have a section on the right to
174. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Among
other rights, the ICCPR prohibits slavery, torture, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment, guarantees the rights to liberty and personal security, ensures legal procedural rights, including
the rights to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established
by law, and guarantees the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law, and the
right to be informed promptly and in detail in a language that the defendant understands of the nature
and cause of the charge against him or her.
175. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.
3. These rights include the rights to work, health care, social security, welfare, and education.
176. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113.
177. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
178. See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 45-46 (2006) ("Abroad, we will work with our allies on three priorities: [1.1 Promoting mean-
ingful reform of the U.N., including . .. {r]einvigorating the U.N.'s commitment, reflected in the U.N.
Charter, to the promotion of democracy and human rights ... . [2.] Enhancing the role of democracies
and democracy promotion throughout international and multilateral institutions, including:
[s]trengthening and institutionalizing the Community of Democracies, [flostering the creation of re-
gional democracy-based institutions in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and elsewhere, [and ilmproving the
capacity of the U.N. and other multilateral institutions to advance the freedom agenda through tools like
the U.N. Democracy Fund . . . .").
179. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, 2008 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, available at http://
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/index.htm.
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unionize, which falls somewhere between an economic right (to representa-
tion in the workplace) and civil right (to associate), and occasionally men-
tion child welfare issues. The reports do not comment on these omissions,
which would appear quite substantial to the many countries that have rati-
fied the ICESCR and related treaties. The unstated assumption is that the
American conception of human rights is the same as the international
human rights addressed in the reports.
The United States has not consistently put economic and military pres-
sure on countries that violate civil and political rights. Like other countries,
it makes exceptions for friends and other important countries with which it
must do business. For example, in 1993 President Clinton granted trade
concessions to China subject to China improving its human rights protec-
tions.18 0 A year later, however, President Clinton backed down from linking
China's trading status to human rights in order to pursue a "new path" in
U.S. relations with China.""1 Delinking human rights from trade was moti-
vated by the U.S. desire to secure China's cooperation in persuading North
Korea not to develop nuclear weapons. The United States also wanted to
make sure it did not lose large trade deals, including the Chinese govern-
ment's aircraft orders, by insisting on progress on civil and political rights
in China.18 2
U.S. international rhetoric relentlessly promotes democracy, and has been
doing so at least since the administration of Woodrow Wilson. In his Four-
teen Points speech that justified American entry into World War I, Wilson
stressed the right to self-determination, which has since been understood to
mean that nations should govern themselves by democratic means. 8 3 This
right appeared in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which laid out the American
(and British) goals in World War 11.184 Throughout the Cold War, the
United States described itself as the leader of the "free world"-in other
words, that part of the world in which democracy flourished. In a famous
article written in 1979, Jeane Kirkpatrick, a future U.N. ambassador under
President Ronald Reagan, justified American support for dictatorships in
the Cold War on the ground that merely authoritarian governments (as op-
posed to communist governments) might eventually democratize. 8 5
180. See R.W. Apple, Jr., The Pacific Summit; Godfather to Pacific Era? Clinton Succeeds by Merely Getting
Asians to Meet, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 21, 1993.
181. President William J. Clinton, Press Conference on China MFN Status 5/26/94 (May 27, 1994),
available at Westlaw 1994 WL 209851.
182. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIc RELATIONs 1065
(5th ed. 2008).
183. See President Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), available at http://www.our
documents.gov/doc.php?doc =62&page= transcript.
184. Atlantic Charter, Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Star. 1600, available at http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-2788FECD-8FACF7 1E/natolive/official-texts_16912.htm.
185. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Dictatorships and Double Standards, COMMENT., Nov. 1979, at 34, 37.
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The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War did not change
the American stance on democracy. Indeed, the U.S. government over three
administrations has made a concerted effort to claim that democracy is a
norm of international law. The Clinton Administration declared its commit-
ment to promote democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, among other
places.1586 The Bush Administration's "freedom agenda" sought to promote
democracy in the Middle East. 8 7 This policy supplied one of the rationales
for the Iraq War. As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama also declared
his support for promotion of democracy abroad, and in the first few months
of his administration, officials have expressed this policy on multiple
occasions.""8
The United States has also promoted free trade and free markets for more
than half a century. The U.S. government initiated the GATT/WTO system
in 1948,'89 and its commitment to maintaining and expanding this system
has never wavered. During the Cold War, the United States distinguished
itself from the Soviet Union in part on the basis of its commitment to mar-
kets. During this period, the United States was also the leading critic of
redistributive claims made by developing countries. With the collapse of
communism, the "Washington Consensus" emerged, a bundle of policy pre-
scriptions that emphasized macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, priva-
tization of government-owned resources, and liberalization of the
economy."90 The United States, predominantly through the IMF and the
World Bank, pressured developing countries to adopt these policies, often
making loans conditional on significant reform in these directions. Ameri-
can institution-building after the Cold War-including the expansion of
NATO, the inauguration of the North American Free Trade Agreement and
the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the development of the GATT
186. See Joint Statement Released in Conjunction with the U.S.-EU Summit, Human Rights and
Democratization Priorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dec. 5, 1997), available at http://www.state.gov/
www/regions/eurleul971205_useu_bosnia hr.html ("The United States and the European Union have
thus decided to coordinate their efforts to enhance their means to work with the parties in a constant
dialogue with the aim of promoting democratic normalization and the stabilization of the region.").
187. See Tamara Cofman Wittes & Sarah E. Yerkes, What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administra-
tion's Freedom Agenda, Analysis Paper No. 10, The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at The Brookings
Institution (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2006/O9middle
eastwittes/wittes20060901.pdf.
188. See, e.g., Deputy U.S. Secretary of State James B. Steinberg, Remarks at the 5th Community of
Democracies Ministerial (July 12, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/s/d/2009/126052.htm (assert-
ing before the Community of Democracies delegates that "{olur common efforts reinforce the universal-
ity of the democratic values and serve as a powerful response to those who would argue that democracy
belongs only to one region, or history or tradition" and listing the many regional "democratic back-
tracking" mechanisms in the AU, OAS, EU, OSCE, and ASEAN).
189. World Trade Organization, The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh, available at hrtp://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/if e/fact4e.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
190. Dani Rodrik, Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion?, 44 J. ECON. LITERA-
TURE 973, 973-74 (2006).
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system with the creation of the WTO-was designed to entrench American
political and economic values as global values.191
2. Military force to maintain global order
The United States believes in the use of military force in order to main-
tain global order and, less explicitly, to advance democracy and human
rights. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a policy of contain-
ment of the Soviet Union-an effort to prevent the Soviet Union from ex-
tending its influence into other countries. The policy took two forms:
bolstering allies and undermining enemies, often with covert operations, in-
cluding the rendering of assistance to indigenous insurgencies. During the
Cuban missile crisis, the United States explicitly used military force in vio-
lation of the U.N. Charter when it blockaded Cuba (a traditional act of war);
other interventions in Latin America were also unilateral. After the Cold
War, the United States turned its focus on "rogue states" that engaged in
illegal conduct, and used force, or threatened to use force, against Panama,
Iraq, Iran, and North Korea.
In general, the United States has tried to give legal justifications for its
use of force. It has frequently cited authority under the U.N. Charter. The
Korean War had Security Council authorization. American participation in
the Vietnam War occurred at the invitation of the South Vietnamese gov-
ernment; hence, it was an example of collective self-defense, which is author-
ized by the U.N. Charter. The Gulf War had Security Council
authorization. So did the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. The Iraq War of
2003 was not explicitly authorized by the Security Council, but the United
States went to great lengths to justify the use of force on the basis of Secur-
ity Council resolutions that suspended hostilities against Iraq at the end of
the 1991 war, conditional on Iraqi cooperation in an inspection regime,
which did not take place. 192
However, the United States has not always derived its authority from the
U.N. Charter. As noted above, in 1999 the United States, along with the
other NATO countries, launched an air attack on Serbia that resulted in
Serbia withdrawing from the renegade province of Kosovo, which it had
been trying to bring under its control. Serbia had long been regarded as a
troublemaker in the Balkans and had sowed disorder through its aggressive
military posture during the collapse of Yugoslavia from 1991 to the Dayton
191. See G. JOHN IKENBERRY, AFTER VICTORY: INSTITUTIONS, STRATEGIC RESTRAINT, AND THE RE-
BUILDING OF ORDER AFTER MAJOR WARS 215-56 (2001).
192. See, e.g., President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc.
338, 338-39 (Mar. 17, 2003) ("Under (Security Council} Resolutions 678 and 687 ... the United States
and our allies are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. This is not a
question of authority. It is a question of will."); U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Presentation to the
United Nations Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4701st mtg. at 2-17, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4701
(Feb. 5, 2003) (arguing that Iraq's failure to comply with Security Council Resolution 1441 warranted
military action against Iraq).
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Peace Accord of 1995.193 The collapse of stability in the region had immedi-
ate harmful impacts on European countries, which had to deal with refugees.
In addition, there was a great deal of pressure to stop the atrocities that were
taking place on all sides. The 1999 invasion had a number of motives-to
support European allies, to prevent Serbians from ethnically cleansing Ko-
sovo of its Albanian stock, and to punish an international troublemaker. The
invasion lacked Security Council authorization.1 9 4
The United States did not always take a consistent line on its legal ratio-
nales for the use of military force. But the most common themes were: Se-
curity Council authorization; self-defense (including collective self-defense);
and protection of democratically elected governments (and sometimes au-
thoritarian governments) from foreign aggression. The Bush Administration
claimed at various points the right to launch preemptive or preventive wars
in self-defense. But the Bush Administration and previous administrations
never claimed that the United States has the exclusive right to go to war for
these purposes; the arguments were always made in universalistic terms. 9 1
Similarly, the American attitude toward international criminal law has
been expressed in universalistic rhetoric. The United States refused to ratify
the Rome Statute and has expressed unhappiness with a range of domestic
statutes in foreign countries that permit prosecution of international crimes
on the basis of universal jurisdiction.19 6 In both cases, the United States
feared politically motivated prosecutions of American soldiers and politi-
cians. It does not trust an international body and foreign governments to
treat Americans fairly. But the United States never sought an exemption for
Americans alone. 197 Its original conception of the ICC was that its authority
would be conditional on Security Council authorization. Once such authori-
193. See Warren Zimmermann, The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia, FOREIGN
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 2, 12-14 (relating a personal account of the dissolution of Yugoslavia).
194. President Clinton contended that Security Council Resolutions 1199 and 1203 implicitly
granted authority for military intervention by affirming "that the deterioration of the situation in Ko-
sovo constitutes a threat to the peace and security of the region." WALTER GARY SHARP, SR.,Jus Paciarii:
Emergent Legal Paradigms for U.N. Peace Operations in the 21st Century 313-14 (1999). The United
Kingdom, Germany, and Belgium argued that authorization was unnecessary since intervention sup-
ported "the values represented in Article 2(4)." James P. Terry, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention after
Kosovo: Legal Reality and Political Pragmatism, ARMY LAW., Aug. 2004, at 36, 45.
195. For instance, on the eve of the invasion of Panama in 1989, President George H.W. Bush argued
that "[the deployment of U.S. Forces is an exercise of the right of self-defense recognized in Article 51 of
the United Nations Charter . . ." and that the United States has often cast the use of military force by the
United States in terms consistent with the U.N. Charter. George H.W. Bush, Letter to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on United States Military Action in Panama,
2 PUB. PAPERS OF GEORGE H.W. BUSH 1734 (1989).
196. See Chitra Ragavan, A Different Brand of Warfare: How Cross-Border Legal Moves are Giving the
White House Lots to Worry About, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REPORT, Mar. 19, 2007.
197. The United States began seeking bilateral immunity agreements after other countries ratified the
Rome Statute. See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Status of US Bilateral Immunity Agree-
ments (BIAs), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFSBIA status...current.pdf (last visited
Nov. 6, 2010).
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zation was secured, the ICC would be able to prosecute anyone in any
country.
B. Explaining American exceptionalism
1. Domestic policy preferences: markets, liberty, democracy
The United States is one of the world's oldest continuous democracies,
and democratic principles are deeply embedded in the political culture. The
negative liberties laid out in the Bill of Rights have also been internalized
by Americans and American institutions. The United States' commitment
to free markets has helped make it the most powerful economy in the world.
Although this commitment to the market is often exaggerated-local regu-
lation is as old as the country, and national regulation of the market has
made significant inroads on laissez-faire economics since the start of the
twentieth-century-there is no doubt that Americans are more committed
to markets than people in other advanced democracies.19 8 The American
economy is also among the least regulated.19'
Americans are also more optimistic about, and tolerant of, war than peo-
ple living in other advanced democracies, particularly those in Europe. This
can in part be attributed to different historical experiences. The United
States emerged as a victor of World War I, and even a more decisive victor
of World War II. In World War I, it suffered battle deaths of 116,516
soldiers.20 0 In comparison, France lost 1,385,000, Germany lost 1,773,700,
Britain lost 908,371, and Russia lost 1,700,000.201 In World War II, the
United States also had significant casualties- 4 05, 4 00 missing or killed-
but far less than Germany (3.5 million missing or killed), Japan (1.7 million
missing or killed), and Russia (7.5 million missing or killed).2 02 While cities
throughout Europe were destroyed by the fighting, the U.S. mainland was
virtually untouched. 20 3 Europeans suffered from refugee crises, hunger, and
austerity in the aftermath of the war; American civilians, on the other hand,
198. See, e.g., Private vs. State Ownership of Business, WORLD VALUES SURvey, http://www.wvsevsdb.
com/wvs/WVSAnalizeQuestion.jsp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) (To access data, navigate to "Online Data
Analysis" subpage, click on "Begin Analysis," select the "WVS 2005-2008" hyperlink, select all coun-
tries to analyze and click on "Confirm Selection," and then follow the "Private vs. State Ownership of
Business" hyperlink).
199. See, e.g., Simeon Djankov et al., The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1, 18 (2002).
200. Meredith R. Sarkees, Correlates of War Inter-State War Data, 1816-1997 (v3.0), http://www.correl
atesofwar.org/cow2dara/WarData/InterState/Inter-State War Participants (V 3-0).csv (last visited Nov. 6,
2010); see generally Meredith R. Sarkees & Phil Schafer, The Correlates of War Data on War: An Update to
1997, 18 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE Sc. 123 (2000) (describing inter-state war data set).
201. Sarkees, Correlates of War Inter-State War Data, 1816-1997 (v3.0), supra note 200.
202. Id. Fighting in both the European and Pacific theatres, the United States still suffered fewer
battle deaths than Britain (418,765 missing or killed). Id. France's military only lost 2500 (missing or
killed); however, since it was occupied after 1940, subsequent losses were only suffered by the forces in
exile at the time of occupation. See id.
203. The United States suffered essentially no civilian deaths; Britain, separated from continental
Europe by the English Channel, had 60,600 killed as a result of aerial bombing; and Germany and Russia
exited the war with 2.35 million and 6.7 million civilians dead, respectively. JOHN Eius, WORLD WAR
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enjoyed an economic boom. Since then, the United States has fought a num-
ber of "small" wars-many of them frustrating and inconclusive, with one
defeat in Vietnam. But in none of these wars did the United States lose more
soldiers than France did in the World War I battle of Verdun alone (which
resulted in the deaths of over 60,000 French soldiers). 204
Europeans and Americans derived different lessons from these exper-
iences. In Europeans one finds a deep strain of pacifism which is almost
unknown in the United States. While European governments joined NATO
and fought in a few small wars, anti-militarism continues to dominate, par-
ticularly on the Continent. Note, however, that anti-militarism has not
spread beyond Europe (with the exception of Japan). China, Russia, India,
Israel, and many other countries have maintained strong armies and fought
major wars since World War II-and China and Russia have suffered in
twentieth-century wars to a degree comparable to that of European
countries.
2. Institutions: populist democracy and powerful military
From an institutional standpoint, three features about the United States
stand out: it is a democracy; it supports a market economy; and it has an
enormous military. We have already discussed the first two features: they
reflect public opinion rooted in tradition. More than that, they are institu-
tions that are widely regarded as successful. It seems natural for Americans
to urge other countries to adopt similar institutions.
But institutions matter in other ways. Democratic peace literature sug-
gests that democracies do not go to war with other democracies, but instead
with non-democracies. 205 If this pattern reflects causal factors, then it is not
surprising that democracies would want other countries, if possible, to be
democracies. The absence of war may be just one manifestation of a deeper
affinity among democracies, which allows them to cooperate in many ways.
Similarly, countries with developed market institutions may prefer to deal
with similar countries; trade is no doubt easier when institutions resemble
each other and reflect market imperatives. European integration, which be-
gan as a customs union but progressed toward a single market, has reflected
these pressures. The U.S. government may thus seek to encourage other
II: A STATISTICAL SURVEY: THE ESSENTIAL FACTS AND FIGURES FOR ALL THE COMBATANTS 253-54
(1993).
204. 4 WORLD WAR I ENCYCLOPEDIA 1222 (Spencer C. Tucker et al. eds., 2005).
205. See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POST-COLD
WAR WORLD (1993). The U.S. government seems to agree. See THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECUR-
ITY STRATEGY FOR A NEW CENTURY 2 (1998) ("In designing our strategy, we recognize that the spread
of democracy supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic gov-
ernments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, and
promote sustainable economic development. They are less likely to wage war or abuse the rights of their
people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American
interests. The United States will support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world.").
41
Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 52
countries to adopt American-style institutions because cooperation with
such countries becomes easier and more beneficial.
The EU shares the United States' commitment to democracy. But this
shared commitment masks different political cultures. In European coun-
tries, the public tends to defer to self-perpetuating political and bureaucratic
elites. Elections are referenda on the performance of the governing party; the
political leaders themselves work their way up the party hierarchy. Ameri-
can democracy has a strong populist skepticism of elites. The political class
is easily penetrated by unknowns who ride a wave of populist enthusiasm
(Jimmy Carter, Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, Ross Perot)-an almost un-
heard-of phenomenon in Europe, where populists are kept at the fringes.206
The EU itself is governed by a bureaucratic elite appointed by the political
elites of its member states. Efforts to overcome this widely recognized
"democratic deficit" by transferring power to the European Parliament have
so far been unsuccessful. 20 7
This divide may explain why European countries support international
institutions more readily than the United States does. These institutions,
like the EU itself, are staffed by the same kind of elite politicians that gov-
ern European countries. Europeans, accustomed to deferring to their leaders,
also defer to the international institutions those leaders create and staff.
Americans, by contrast, distrust their leaders. Fearing a backlash from the
voters, American politicians are reluctant to insist that those voters submit
to another, even more remote layer of bureaucratic governance at the inter-
national level.
The third institutional feature mentioned above-the enormous mili-
tary-also sets the United States apart from other states. It is an understate-
ment to say that the United States is the most dominant military power in
the world. In 2005, the United States spent $503 billion on military ex-
penditures, almost half of the $1.16 trillion spent worldwide. 208 As Table 1
shows, in absolute terms U.S. spending dwarfs the amounts spent on the
nine next most expensive militaries. 2 09 This was not always the case. The
United States was a military weakling in the nineteenth-century up until
World War I. But wealthy, populous countries can become military powers,
206. While some European populists have risen to prominence in recent years, such as Joerg Haider,
Jean Marie Le Pen, and Geert Wilders, this position remains the exception more than the norm, as it is in
the United States. These populist figures have also remained marginal in European politics; they have not
obtained (or kept) real political power like their counterparts in the United States. For an overview of the
greater prevalence of American populism compared to Europe, see Steiker, supra note 93, at 114-17.
207. See Rabkin, supra note 77, at 274.
208. U.S. Dep't of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005, available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/121776.pdf
209. In relative terms, however, the United States spends only 4.06 percent of its GDP on military
expenditures, which ranks it 25th out of the 173 countries ranked by the CIA. Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook, Country Comparison: Military Expenditures, available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2034rank.htmi (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
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and the United States did so during World War 1I. Since then, its only rival
has been the now-defunct Soviet Union.
TABLE 1: COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST MILITARY
EXPENDITURES, 2005210
Country Military Expenditures (Billions)
United States $503.0
China $ 85.3
United Kingdom $ 55.9
France $ 52.9
Japan $ 43.9
Germany $ 38.1
Italy $ 33.5
Russia $ 31.1
Saudi Arabia $ 25.4
India $ 18.8
The United States maintained an enormous military during the Cold War
because of the Soviet threat. Accordingly, people believed that the collapse
of the Soviet Union would deliver a "peace dividend" in the form of smaller
budgets. The era of small military budgets was brief, however, as it became
clear that the United States could use military force to achieve its foreign
policy aims. Indeed, the United States became embroiled in several more
wars after the end of the Cold War, culminating in the conflict with Al
Qaeda.
It is hardly surprising, then, that the United States would try to protect
its freedom to use military force, just as it is not surprising that the United
States would seek to duplicate its democratic and market institutions in
foreign countries. It is playing to its institutional strengths. But in taking
these positions, the United States uses universalistic rhetoric. It does not
claim that the United States alone should be able to use its military; rather,
all countries have the same right to resort to military force under defined
circumstances.2 11 Similarly, democracy and free markets are not just the pre-
210. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 208.
211. For a statement of these circumstances, see THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
22 (2010) (stating that force "may be necessary to defend [the United States) and allies or to preserve
broader peace and security, including by protecting civilians facing a grave humanitarian crisis," and that
the United States will "exhaust other options before war whenever [it} can," "seek broad international
support" when force is used, but "reservels) the right to act unilaterally if necessary [for defense]").
43
44 Harvard International Law journal / Vol. 52
rogatives of the United States: all people should have access to democratic
and market institutions.
V. ARE EXCEPTIONALIST STATES ALSo EXEMPTIONALIST?
We have argued that the great powers-including the United States, the
EU, and China-advance their exceptionalist views of international law in
ways that reflect their distinctive values and serve their particular interests.
None of the exceptionalist states, however, calls for a different set of rules
that would apply to that state alone. Instead, each calls for a universal appli-
cation of the international rules embedding its respective exceptionalist vi-
sion. This is the key distinction between exceptionalism and
exemptionalism.
A. Rejecting American, European and Chinese exemptionalism
In Part I, we disputed the contention that the United States is exemp-
tionalist. As we noted, there are no examples of the United States explicitly
arguing that it is exempt from the rules that apply to other countries. Like
other great powers, the United States advances a particular vision of interna-
tional law that reflects its values, serves its interests, and takes advantage of
its institutional capacities. But its vision is universal, in the sense that the
rules and interpretations it advances are the same for all countries. 2 1 2 The
United States has frequently insisted that its norms and practices should
212. The U.S. leaders often emphasize the United States' unique role and leadership in the world,
which may-mistakenly, in our view-be perceived as evidence of American exemptionalism. See Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Acceptance Speech for the Nobel Prize in Peace (Dec. 10, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.whirehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobe-peace-prize) ("The
United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood
of our citizens and the strength of our arms. The service and sacrifice of our men and women in uniform
has promoted peace and prosperity from Germany to Korea, and enabled democracy to take hold in
places like the Balkans. We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have
done so out of enlightened self-interest-because we seek a better future for our children and grandchil-
dren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others' children and grandchildren can live in
freedom and prosperity."); see also President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002)
(transcript available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/4540) ("And we have a
great opportunity during this time of war to lead the world toward the values that will bring lasting
peace . . . . America will lead by defending liberty and justice because they are right and true and
unchanging for all people everywhere . ... We have no intention of imposing our culture. But America
will always stand firm for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity . . . ."); President William J.
Clinton, Address on Bosnia (Nov. 27, 1995) (transcript available at http://millercenter.org/scripps/
archive/speeches/detail/3929) ("From our birth, America has always been more than just a place. America
has embodied an idea that has become the ideal for billions of people throughout the world . . . . In this
century especially, America has done more than simply stand for these ideals. We have acted on them
and sacrificed for them. Our people fought two World Wars so that freedom could triumph over tyranny
.... After World War II, we continued to lead the world. We made the commitments that kept the
peace, that helped to spread democracy, that created unparalleled prosperity, and that brought victory in
the cold war . . . . Today, because of our dedication, America's ideals-liberty, democracy, and peace-
are more and more the aspirations of people everywhere in the world. It is the power of our ideas, even
more than our size, our wealth, and our military might, that makes America a uniquely trusted nation.").
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provide the basis for international law. This is different from the United
States exempting itself from the rules that apply to other states.
It is also wrong to depict the EU as an exemptionalist power. Critics have
pointed out that the EU is a champion of multilateral trade liberalization,
yet the European single market is the most extreme example of trade-divert-
ing regionalism. Similarly, the EU promotes the most-favored nation princi-
ple in the WTO, yet maintains preferential trading arrangements with
former European colonies. 2 13 But the EU is not seeking to carve out an ex-
emption for itself. Instead, the EU claims, it takes the stand that regional-
ism is compatible with multilateralism; that regional trade blocks are
building blocks for multilateral trade liberalization.214 Similarly, preferen-
tial trade agreements are consistent with the principle of "special and differ-
ential treatment" of developing countries. 2 1 5
It is also wrong to suggest that the EU's voting practices amount to ex-
emptionalism. 216 The EU is not enjoying the privilege of double-voting.
Depending on whether the issue falls under the European Community com-
petence or the national competence, the EU either casts the votes on behalf
of the member states or the member states cast their votes individually. 2 17
The EU cannot vote independently in addition to the votes cast by member
states. 2 18 The practice of coordinating a negotiation position yet casting in-
dividual votes is consistent with the character of the EU: the EU is not a
state, but rather a tight economic community and a loose political union
among twenty-seven independent nation states. That independent nation
states each retain a right to vote is not exemptional.
The best argument for European exemptionalism comes from the global
climate change negotiations. The EU insisted it would be treated as a single
state when calculating the emissions that the EU members were entitled to
213. See Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997).
214. Jacques Delors, The Future of Free Trade in Europe and the World, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 715,
723-24 (1995).
215. On the legal basis of this claim, see supra note 160 and accompanying text.
216. See Safrin, supra note 18, at 1328 (claiming that the EU seeks different rules for itself because of
the "exceptional accommodations" its institutional structures require).
217. In the WTO, however, individual member states vote even though the external trade policy falls
under the European Community's competence. This is partly justified by the expansion of the WTO to
new areas, including services and intellectual property rights, where the EC and the member states share
competence and where the EU could not legally exercise the vote of its individual member states. See
Opinion 1/94, Re The Uruguay Round Agreements, Decision of 15 November 1994, 1994 E.C.R. I-
5267, 1-3. Consistent with their individual voting rights, all member states pay dues to the WTO
based on their total trade, including intra-EU trade. BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KosTECKI,
THE POuTICAL ECONOMY OF THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 56 (2d ed. 2001).
218. See, e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
22, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. For a sole
example to the contrary, see Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International
Registration of Marks, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.wipo.int/madridlen/legal-texts/trtdocs
wo016.html.
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under the Kyoto Protocol.219 In practice this "Kyoto bubble" meant that
some EU member states' increases in emissions could be offset by emission
reductions in others. 220 The EU first opposed a similar arrangement within
other developed countries. This, some would argue, would have amounted
to EU exemptionalism. 22 1 However, other states rejected the EU's proposal
for sui generis treatment, and the EU agreed to allow emissions trading be-
tween other states as well. 22 2 Consequently, this possible (but failed) exemp-
tionalism in connection with the climate change negotiations aside, the
argument for the EU's exemptionalism remains thin.
China has also been accused of exemptionalism. Critics point to China's
insistence on differential treatment to account for its developmental
needs. 22 3 However, China does not argue that it alone should benefit from
this principle. China argues that, as a general rule, international obligations
should be relaxed for all developing countries (including, but not limited to,
China).22 4 It is not a coincidence that China is among the many beneficiaries
of this universal rule. No state advances international rules that are inconsis-
tent with its national interests. But a state pursuing a universal rule that is
consistent with its interests is not the same as a state that embraces exemp-
tionalism, even if that universal rule would at times lead to a state being
exempted from some international responsibilities.
219. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol Targets, available at
http://unfccc.int/kyoto-protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) ("The 15 States who were
EU members in 1990 will redistribute their targets among themselves, taking advantage of a scheme
under the Protocol known as a 'bubble', whereby countries have different individual targets, but which
combined make an overall target for that group of countries.").
220. It is also questionable that the "Kyoto bubble" should be considered exemptionalist per se.
When a regional trading block is formed, the WTO allows for an individual country belonging to a
regional customs union or a free trade area to increase its duties and other barriers to trade as long as
trade barriers on the whole will not be higher than the corresponding duties and trade barriers before the
formation of the regional trading block. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. XXIV:5(a),
XXIV:5(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-il, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The idea is the same: offsetting emissions or
trade barriers is allowed as long as the EU as a whole ensures that a certain maximum level of tariffs or
emissions is not exceeded.
221. Safrin, supra note 18, at 1334-35.
222. See id. at 1332-33; cf Convention on Biological Diversity, Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working
Group on Biosafety, Individual Government Submissions on the Contents of the Future Protocol, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/BSWG/Inf.2, at 93-106 (May 6, 1997), available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/bs/
bswg-02/information/bswg-02-inf-02-en.pdf (indicating that the EU proposed separate treatment for re-
gional economic integration organizations).
223. See Safrin, supra note 18, at 1350; C. Fred Bergsten, A Partnership of Equals: How Washington
Should Respond to China's Economic Challenge, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2008, at 58 (reporting that some
have construed China's policy as "the usual free-riding and skirting of responsibility by a powerful
newcomer"); cf Stanley J. Michalak, U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Part 5: The U.S. Must
Reassess Its Role, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER 477, at 7-8 (1985), available at http://www.policy
archive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/9236.pdf (accusing developing countries, generally, of keeping
double standards); John N. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, 78 Am. J. INT'i. L. 145,
167 (1984) (arguing that the international community is more tolerant of violations of law when totali-
tarian regimes, generally, act purportedly for "revolutionary" or "anti-imperialist" goals).
224. See Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Insists That Its Steps on Climate Be Voluntary, N.Y.
TiMEs, Jan. 29, 2010, at AS (noting that "China is banding together with other major developing
nations to stress that only the wealthier countries need to make internationally binding commitments").
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To illustrate the difference between exceptionalism and exemptionalism,
consider income tax policy as an example from domestic law. Few would
portray progressive income tax policy as a kind of exemptionalism for the
poor. Most people believe that different individuals have "common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities" to pay taxes. Progressive taxation, instead, re-
flects a public policy based on the idea of fairness and redistribution, and can
be contrasted with policies that exempt specified individuals from paying
their taxes. China, similarly, does not seek to create a system that exempts
China alone from its rules; rather, it seeks universal commitment to a "pro-
gressive" system of international law with development-adjusted rights and
responsibilities.
China is not the sole beneficiary of the developmentalist international
order. The World Bank classifies only sixty-nine countries as high-income
countries. 225 The rest are commonly viewed as developing countries. China
also acknowledges that some countries are appropriately perceived as "least
developed countries" that are entitled to even greater flexibilities than
China and other "wealthier developing countries. "226 Also, assuming that
China can maintain its trajectory of economic development, China will one
day lose its status as a developing country. Nothing in China's international
law rhetoric suggests that any country, China included, would have an in-
herent or lasting basis of claiming a right to special and differential
treatment.
B. Exemptionalism and violation of international law
One might argue that states' rhetoric is immaterial; what matters instead
is their behavior. The United States is exemptionalist because it violates
international law that does not suit its interests. It hardly matters that the
United States does not admit that it violates international law, or does not
claim a de jure privilege to violate international law that binds others. Be-
hind the rhetoric, the United States engages in de facto exemptionalism.
225. See The World Bank, Country and Lending Groups, available at http://go.worldbank.org/D7SN
OB8YU0 (last visited Nov. 6, 2010).
226. China suggested this differentiation between developing countries during international climate
change negotiations. See Press Release, National Development and Reform Comm'n of the People's Re-
public of China, Implementation of the Bali Roadmap: China's Position on the Copenhagen Climate
Change Conference (May 20, 2009), available at http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/t20090521_2803
82.htm (stating that least developed countries, particularly among developing countries, need assistance
adapting to climate change); Sun Xiaohua et al., African Nations Will Stay at the Table, CHINA DAnLY,
Dec. 15, 2010, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/15/content-9179402.htm (re-
porting China's preference for least developed countries to receive preferential treatment in receiving
funds for climate change mitigation and adaption); Jim Yardley, China Says Rich Countries Should Take the
Lead on Global Warming, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 7, 2007. Nor is China alone in making this distinc-
tion. India has also suggested that not all developing countries should be treated alike in international
negotiations on climate change. See Rama Lakshmi, India's Carbon Fighters Must Wait, WASH. POST, Oct.
19, 2009.
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The problem with this argument is that all states violate international
law some of the time. For the United States, the bill of particulars includes
the 2003 Iraq War, the 1999 Kosovo War, torture and extraordinary rendi-
tion in connection with the war on terror, and a number of trade violations.
For the EU, there is a similar list-the 1999 Kosovo War, complicity in
extraordinary rendition, trade violations, and-for a substantial group of
member states-the 2003 Iraq War. For China, an authoritarian state, one
can point to extensive human rights violations, including the suppression of
political dissent and religious freedom. Ordinary states also sometimes vio-
late international law. Human rights violations, including torture, 227 and
violations of countries' WTO obligations are widespread.
Our argument is not that the United States violates international law less
than other countries do. We do not seek to, or even know how to, measure
and compare violations. Our argument, instead, is that, qualitatively speak-
ing, there is nothing distinctive about the United States. Like the other
major powers, and indeed like many normal states, it sometimes violates
international law. Either all states are exemptionalist, in which case the term
is useless, or none are.
A similar point can be made about behavior that falls short of interna-
tional law violation but that is in tension with a state's exceptionalist stance
on international law. As we noted earlier, many people argue that the
United States engages in double standards when it coddles friendly dictators
while proclaiming a commitment to human rights. The EU, of course, en-
gages in similar behavior. Both the United States and the EU try to main-
tain friendly relations with China, Russia, and other authoritarian states
because of their geopolitical and economic importance. These countries are
simply balancing objectives that are not always consistent-prosperity and
security, on the one hand, and the promotion of human rights, on the other.
China does the same thing, but in the opposite direction. Having pro-
claimed the inviolability of sovereignty, it has joined some resolutions con-
demning human rights violations in other states. 2 28 Doing so, China is
compromising its stance on international law for reputational reasons-it
wants to maintain good relations with the human-rights promoting states.
As we noted above, China's position on free trade and the right to develop-
ment is not always carried through consistently. 229
227. See, e.g., Michael J. Gilligan & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, Do Norms Reduce Torture?, 38 J. LEGAL
STUD. 445 (2009).
228. See supra note 125 and accompanying text (describing China's decision to join in condemnation
of Myanmar).
229. For a book-length account of China's compliance with international law, see generally CHAN,
supra note 167, at 205 (arguing that China's compliance with arms control treaties is "satisfactory," with
trade treaties is "good," with human rights treaties is "fair to poor," and with environmental protection
treaties is "poor").
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In sum, all states have multiple objectives that are in tension with one
another. The compromises that result are simply normal politics, not special
behavior that deserves the label of exemptionalism.
C. Embedded exemptionalism in international law
The above discussion has shown that none of the exceptionalist states are
explicitly exemptionalist. In forgoing exemptionalism, however, exception-
alist states do not forgo their own interests. Exceptionalist states consist-
ently take advantage of international institutions that are constructed in
ways that favor them. They have been central in creating-and remain es-
sential in maintaining- international institutions that embody their influ-
ence and preferences. The formation of international institutions has enabled
exceptional states to create hierarchies, reinforce privileges, and institution-
alize their disproportionate influence over international law.
The United Nations offers the most compelling example of the presence
of exemptionalism, or "double standards," in international law. The United
States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia all enjoy a permanent
seat and a right to a veto in the Security Council. The U.N. Charter explic-
itly sets the exceptionalist states apart from all other states and vests them
with exclusive rights and responsibilities. This is the most significant depar-
ture from the principle of the sovereign equality of states. Most commenta-
tors concede that the composition of the Security Council fails to correspond
to the distribution of power in today's world.230 Some further question the
fairness and the legitimacy of the organization as a result.23 1 Still, granting
the permanent five members of the Security Council a privileged position
among nations remains widely accepted-if only because of the political
infeasibility of any alternative: the current five permanent members are un-
likely to agree to empower other states by disempowering themselves.232
A similar charge of "collective exemptionalism" or "double standards"
may be lodged against the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons ("NPT"). The NPT divides states into nuclear and non-nuclear
states and vests the two groups of states with different rights and obliga-
tions. Under the NPT, states that do not possess nuclear weapons renounce
any future acquisition of such weapons and undertake to pursue nuclear
230. See, e.g., Jacob K. Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organization: The Operational
Constitution and Its Critics, 103 Am. J. INT'L L. 209, 240 (2009) (listing various U.N. General Assembly
discussions on whether to change the composition of the Security Council and explaining the G-4's bid
for seats in the Security Council).
231. See, e.g., David D. Caron, The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J.
INT'L L. 552, 558-60 (1993) (explaining how perceptions of illegitimacy that arise when the organiza-
tion fails to live up to its "promise and spirit" may lead to failed negotiations).
232. See Daniel W. Drezner, The New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2007, at 35 (suggesting
that European nations are unwilling to "reduce their overrepresentation in multilateral institutions"); Cf
Yehuda Z. Blum, Proposalsfor UN Security Council Reform, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 632, 643-44 (2005) (analyz-
ing the potential power struggles that would result if countries tried to add seats to the Security
Council).
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technology only for civilian purposes. In contrast, states that do possess nu-
clear weapons (the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and
France-the permanent members of the Security Council) 233 undertake to
pass nuclear technology to non-nuclear weapon states only for peaceful pur-
poses. Thus, like the U.N. Charter, the NPT openly sets the exemptionalist
(nuclear) states apart from normal (non-nuclear) states. However, unlike the
U.N. Charter, the NPT provides for a quid pro quo. The non-nuclear states
have no obligation to enter the NPT and are free to develop nuclear weapons
technology without violating international law.
Similar to the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank were set up after
World War II to reflect the distribution of power at that time, which dis-
proportionally favored the United States and the European states. The
Americans and Europeans designed a voting system that allowed them to
dominate decision-making. Although the United States only constitutes five
percent of the population of the IMF member states, it enjoys nearly seven-
teen percent of the votes-enough to give it a single-handed veto right over
all decisions-whereas the Europeans control forty percent of the vote, de-
spite only comprising thirteen percent of the IMF member state popula-
tion.23 4 This is particularly striking when contrasted with the five percent
voting share that China and India collectively hold. 23 5 The voting power in
the World Bank mirrors that of the IMF.23 6 In addition, since the founding
of the Bretton Woods institutions in 1944, the Europeans have chosen the
head of the IMF and the Americans have nominated the head of the World
Bank. This de facto control of both institutions gives the United States and
the EU special status that allows them to grant loans and debt relief based
on geopolitical and ideological considerations. 23 7
The WTO embodies a less hierarchical decision-making structure: it op-
erates on the principle of consensus and gives all member states an equal
vote. In practice, however, states with the largest economies drive the nego-
tiation process. Similarly, the enforcement of WTO commitments remains
largely the privilege of powerful states; powerful states may violate their
trade commitments toward weaker trading partners, knowing that weaker
states are unlikely to carry out retaliation against them even if they secure
233. India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel, which are either commonly known or widely believed
to possess nuclear weapons, are not participants to the NPT. North Korea signed the NPT, violated it,
and subsequently withdrew from it.
234. See Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Executive Directors and Voting Power, http://www.imf.orglexternall
np/sec/memdir/eds.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010); Jeffrey D. Sachs, The FP Memo: Urgent: How to Run the
International Monetary Fund, FOREIGN POL', July-Aug. 2004, at 60, 61.
235. See Sachs, supra note 234, at 61.
236. See World Bank, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Subscriptions and Voting Power
of Member Countries, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATI
ON/BODEXT/O,,contenrMDK:20124831-menuPK:64020035-pagePK:64020054-piPK:64020408-
theSitePK:278036,00.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
237. See Sachs, supra note 234, at 61 (insinuating that the current IMF managing director owes his job
to the collusion of rich countries).
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the WTO's authorization to do so. 23 8 Powerful states are therefore rarely
targets of trade sanctions, 23 9 yet are uniquely positioned to employ trade
sanctions against their trade partners. 240 Though the WTO rules seem egali-
tarian on the surface, a closer look at the operation of these rules reveals a
familiar hierarchical structure, present in most international institutions.
There is a significant irony here. While the IMF, the World Bank, the
WTO, and many other international institutions have been criticized for
their bias toward powerful countries, the United Nations has largely avoided
this charge. Yet the United Nations is the only international institution that
has the power to issue orders that legally bind all states while giving a
privileged group of states the power to ensure that those orders never apply
to them. Reform efforts have focused on expanding the group of states with
veto power-adding, for example, Germany, Japan, Brazil, or India-but
not in eliminating the basic distinction between great powers with veto
rights or other privileges, and ordinary states without those privileges. All
states-the exceptional as well as the ordinary-appear to acquiesce in the
basic premise of the Security Council: significant interventions to keep the
peace require the consent of the most powerful states, but not the consent of
other states.
If this system has exemptionalist overtones, it has nothing to do with
exceptionalism. No single exceptional state has authority in the U.N. sys-
tem; instead, authority is shared by a group of powerful states, some of them
exceptional, some not. The U.N. system does not reflect any single country's
distinctive vision; it reflects an overlapping consensus among the great pow-
ers and ordinary countries. 241
Now let us consider again the ICC. As we noted above, the EU sought to
give the ICC independent authority to initiate prosecutions and trials. The
United States sought to make the ICC's authority depend on Security Coun-
cil authorization, which would have given the United States (and other per-
manent members) a right of veto and, in effect, immunized their citizens
from prosecution. It is widely agreed that the EU position was "universalis-
tic," while the American position was exemptionalist.
If this argument is correct, it reflects a deep irony. The U.S. position was
just to add the ICC to the Security Council's long list of existing powers.
Thus, the argument boils down to a claim that increasing the power of the
238. See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking WITO Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 792, 816-17 (2001).
239. However, the powerful exceptionalist states may still engage in trade disputes among them-
selves, since the threat of retaliation is credible for those countries.
240. For example, Ecuador needs access to the U.S. market much more than the United States needs
access to the Ecuadorian market. Ecuador would therefore be vulnerable to U.S. sanctions whereas the
United States would be only mildly harmed by retaliatory tariffs on the Ecuadorian border. Ecuador is
also more likely to be dependent on U.S. imports, and the decision to restrict the entry of U.S. goods into
its market is likely to hurt Ecuador much more than the United States. Thus, the United States may
intentionally violate its commitments to Ecuador, knowing that Ecuador cannot follow through on its
threats.
241. The same argument applies to the NPT.
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Security Council reflects an exemptionalist agenda-even though the Secur-
ity Council has a high level of international legitimacy.
But there is a more serious problem with the argument. The claim that
the U.S. position is exemptionalist rests on a strong distinction between de
jure and de facto arguments. The United States can argue that its position is
(de jure) universal because no special exception is made for Americans-
Americans would not be granted immunity under the Rome Statute as the
United States envisioned it. The skeptics might respond that the United
States would be given de facto immunity because of its veto in the Security
Council. An exemptionalist charge, however, can also be turned against the
Europeans. The Rome Statute, as ratified, is universalistic in the sense that
it applies to all nations. But, de facto, it does not apply to the Europeans
because relatively few European soldiers are sent into combat, and European
law enforcement authorities investigate and prosecute international crimes,
thus satisfying the complementarity provision of the Rome Statute. The
Rome Statute would create greater risks for the United States than for
Europeans because of the more frequent (and aggressive) use of military force
by the former. So if the U.S. position on the Rome Statute was exemptional-
ist, so was the European position that was finally adopted-in the sense that
both powers were determined to ensure that their own soldiers would never
have to stand trial before the ICC.
Exemptionalism in this sense means a posture of advocating international
treaties that place burdens on other states and no burdens, or fewer burdens,
on one's own state. There are many ways to go about this argument. One
could argue that obligations are contingent on the approval of an institution
in which one has a veto right (the U.S. position). In contrast, one could
argue that obligations are such that one's own state already satisfies them
and other states do not (the European position). The principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities is a third version of this idea; under this
proposal, developing states are given more limited obligations than devel-
oped states. To condemn exemptionalism in this sense is to condemn all
states, because all states enter treaty negotiations with an eye toward maxi-
mizing their benefits and minimizing their burdens. It is hard to make sense
of exemptionalism except in the formal sense of demanding exemptions
from general obligations of international law. Otherwise, charges of exemp-
tionalism are just a complaint that a state fails to comply with international
morality.
The essence of the debate over exemptionalism should now be clear. It is
an attempt to transform the debate about international morality, which is
endlessly contested, into a debate about formal legal compliance with the
law, which can at least in principle be resolved with legal methods. But the
transformation fails. If exemptionalism is understood in a substantive
sense-all treaties should be "fair"-it does not differ from international
morality. If exemptionalism is understood in a formal sense-all states (or
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all similarly situated states) should be subject to the same obligations-it
does constrain states. Nevertheless, by advocating universal legal obligations
that burden other states and do not burden themselves, states can avoid
charges of exemptionalism in the formal sense without sacrificing their own
interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
There has been a long debate about American exceptionalism which, until
recently, has focused on American ideology, culture, and institutions. This
debate has focused on those aspects of American life that set it apart from
the rest of the world; explanations have been sought in unique features of
American history. Discussions about the relationship between American ex-
ceptionalism and foreign policy are more recent. Scholars have again identi-
fied what seems to be unique about the United States by focusing on
American foreign policy. They have then tried to explain how these distinc-
tive features of American foreign policy have their source in America's
unique history. The foreign policy debate, unlike the original debate, has a
strongly negative cast. American exceptionalism in foreign policy means
that the United States does not comply with the universal rules of interna-
tional law-it prefers to maximize its power or pursue idiosyncratic political
ends.
Our main argument is that, although there is much to criticize in Ameri-
can foreign policy, exceptionalism is not a useful target of criticism. Indeed,
a careful examination of the critics' arguments reveals that they are not con-
cerned with American exceptionalism or even exceptionalism per se; instead,
they disapprove of American exceptionalism, wishing that the United States
displayed European exceptionalism-that is, the approach to international
law that European countries have taken. This discussion has shown that
most powerful states are "exceptionalist" in the sense that they seek to em-
body their values and interests in international law. The criticism of excep-
tionalism, then, is just a criticism of power, or the use of power to achieve
ends of which the critic disapproves.
Stronger complaints about exemptionalism (as opposed to exceptionalism)
also turn out to be unpersuasive. All states violate international law some of
the time; it makes little sense to call violators exemptionalists. If exemp-
tionalism is understood to be the posture that a state does not have to follow
rules that apply to all other states, then no state is exemptionalist; the cate-
gory is effectively empty. If exemptionalism is understood to be a tendency
to support treaties that place greater burdens on other countries and fewer
(or no) burdens on one's own country, then all states are exemptionalist.
This is just a normal part of international bargaining.
The complaint that the United States, or any other state, has an excep-
tionalist vision of international law leads down a blind alley. The argument
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gets mired in impossible-to-answer questions about the true content of in-
ternational law and the degree to which a particular state departs from it in
public statements or behavior. The whole inquiry is misdirected because
international law is itself the product of the overlapping consensus among
states, and constantly evolves as that consensus shifts in response to new
circumstances. The question is not whether a particular country's vision of
international law is exceptionalist; the question is whether that vision is
appealing as a matter of policy and political morality. This latter question is
a much more difficult one, but it is the only question that counts.
